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Introduction

Confidentiality is central to the practice of law.
Indeed,
confidentiality is a substantial part of the bedrock on which both
litigation and transactional practices are built. Lawyers' duty to protect
client communications and information is variously embodied and
enforced:
the attorney-client privilege is a critical component of
evidence law, the work product doctrine provides important immunity
against the discovery of attorneys' files and mental impressions, and
state ethics rules make confidentiality a professional responsibility
concern. Of these three aspects of confidentiality, none is as widely
accepted or enduring as the attorney-client privilege. Even so, there
seems to be a sense among lawyers that the attorney-client privilege is
eroding-they can no longer assure themselves or their clients that
confidential communications can in fact be shielded from adversaries.'
Lawyers' unease about the strength of protection afforded by the
attorney-client privilege traces back to 1999, when then-Deputy Attorney
General Eric H. Holder, Jr. distributed a memorandum addressing the
federal prosecution of corporations to all United States Attorneys and
senior lawyers within the Department of Justice.2
The "Holder
Memorandum," as it came to be known, "provides guidance as to what
factors should generally inform a prosecutor" in deciding whether to
charge a corporation with a crime in a particular case. 3 One of the
factors to be considered is a "corporation's timely and voluntary
disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of the
corporate attorney-client and work product privileges.",4 The Holder
Memorandum further provides that in "gauging the extent" of a
corporation's cooperation, federal prosecutors may consider the
company's willingness "to disclose the complete results of its internal
investigation, and to waive the attomey-client and work product
privileges.", 5 The Holder Memorandum was followed in 2003 by the
"Thompson Memorandum," in which then-Deputy Attorney General
Larry Thompson reinforced and reiterated many of the same points.6
1. See Molly McDonough, Flying Under the Radar, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2005, at 34, 36
(identifying the erosion of the attorney-client privilege as a critical current legal issue
"that will affect the justice system and the legal profession").
2. Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General of the United States of
America, to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999),
availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html.
3. Id. at 1.
4. Id. at3.
5. Id. at6.
6. See AM. BAR ASS'N, TASK FORCE ON THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, REPORT
14-15 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/home.shtml (last
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In addition to the policies expressed in the Holder Memorandum
and Thompson Memorandum, the federal government has laid siege to
the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity by attacking
them in ex parte proceedings via crime-fraud exceptions 7 and by
deeming their waiver to be "cooperation" for purposes of avoiding
regulatory action or civil penalties. 8 In early 2004, the United States
Sentencing Commission approved new guidelines, providing that in
some circumstances a corporation may be required to waive the attorneyclient privilege and work product immunity to satisfy the requirements of
cooperation and minimize any criminal penalty. 9 Although this blow to
the privilege and work product immunity has been softened by a
subsequent Supreme Court decision rendering the federal sentencing
guidelines advisory,' 0 corporate counsel remain justifiably concerned
about the guidelines' effect."
Events on the civil front have been no more reassuring. Corporate
scandals have brought lawyers' confidentiality obligations to the
forefront in unflattering ways, leading to suggestions from various
groups that investor and public confidence in the financial markets
demand that lawyers favor disclosure over confidentiality when
presented with instances of possible client misconduct. 12 Additionally,
electronic discovery issues and the transmission of documents in
electronic form have revealed new ways in which the attorney-client
privilege may be inadvertently waived, or in which client confidentiality
may be compromised. 13
visited July 22, 2005).
7. AM. COLL. OF

TRIAL LAW., THE EROSION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
AND WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 3 (2002).

8. See SEC Issues Report of Investigation and Statement Setting Forth Framework
For Evaluating Cooperation In Exercising ProsecutorialDiscretion, SEC Release No.
2001-117 (Oct. 23, 2001) (discussing a report identifying four broad measures of a
company's cooperation with the Securities and Exchange Commission causing the SEC
to decide against enforcement action related to the company's "financial statement
irregularities" to include "providing the Commission staff with all information relevant to
the underlying violations and the company's remedial efforts") (emphasis added),
availableat http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2001-117.txt (last visited May 28, 2005).
9. See Sentencing Commission Approves Changes to Guidelines Pertaining to
Oragnizations, 20 ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 207 (Apr.

21, 2004).
10. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
11. See Leonard Post, Eroding PrivilegeHurts Corporate Compliance, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 25, 2005, at 6 (discussing this issue and related concerns).
12. For a thoughtful and balanced analysis of the disclosure obligations of lawyers
practicing before the SEC, see Giovanni P. Prezioso, Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks
before the American Bar Association Section of Business Law 2004 Spring Meeting
(Apr. 3, 2004), availableat http://www.sec.gov/news/speech.shtml#staff04.
13. See Terry L. Hill & Jennifer S. Johnson, The Impact of ElectronicData upon an
Attorney's Client, 54 FED'N DEF. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 95, 106-12 (2004) (discussing
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In fact, the attorney-client privilege has always been narrowly
construed and enforced,14 and it has always been capable of being
waived by almost any voluntary disclosure running contrary to its
assertion.' 5 In many instances lawyers too casually assume the
application of the privilege, or do not appreciate the ease with which it
may be waived.1 6 Similarly, lawyers often are too quick to assume the
application of the work product doctrine, and many do not appreciate the
broad confidentiality obligation imposed by state ethics rules. It is
against this backdrop that this Article examines the current contours of
the attorney-client privilege and related confidentiality concerns.
Looking ahead, Section II discusses fundamental aspects of the
attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, and lawyers' ethical
duty of confidentiality. Section III discusses privilege and work product
in the employment of public relations consultants. Parties in high profile
cases do battle in court and in the press, and public relations consultants
are often involved in litigation-related decisions. Section IV examines
an important subject in light of recent corporate scandals and related
reforms: attorneys' communications with clients' auditors, and the
associated effect on the attorney-client privilege and work product
immunity. Because parallel government and civil proceedings are now a
fixture on the litigation landscape, Section V examines the selective
waiver doctrine. Section VI discusses privilege and work product in
common interest arrangements.
Section VII examines recent
developments in the law of inadvertent waiver, a serious and recurring
issue for litigants. Recognizing the role technology now plays in legal
practice, Section VIII discusses the transmission and receipt of invisible
information in electronic documents. Section IX briefly examines
whether the cooperation clauses found in most insurance policies waives
the insured's attorney-client privilege in a dispute with the insurer.
Finally, Section X analyzes waiver of the attorney-client privilege by
trustees, examiners, liquidators and receivers.

inadvertent waiver of privilege and work product immunity in electronic distribution of
information); David H. Bernstein & D. Peter Harvey, Ethics and Privilege in the Digital
Age, 39 TRADEMARK REP. 1240, 1266-77 (2003) (discussing privilege, work product and
waiver in the digital age).
14. See, e.g., People v. Urbano, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 871, 874-76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that privilege did not apply to defendant's statements to lawyer in courtroom
made so loudly that they could be easily overheard by others).
15. Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1482 (8th Cir. 1996); Profit Mgmt. Dev., Inc. v.
Jacobson, Brandvik & Anderson, Ltd., 721 N.E.2d 826, 835 (Il1.App. Ct. 1999).
16. See Lugosch v. Congel, 219 F.R.D. 220, 235 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (explaining that
"[c]ontrary to modem and ill-informed perceptions," the attorney-client privilege is
narrowly construed and "riddled with exceptions," and that it is a "less than sacrosanct
rule" subject to "waivers upon waivers").
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Privilege, Immunity and Confidentiality

Confidential communications between attorneys and clients are
protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege, and often by
work product immunity. These doctrines are separate and distinct from
lawyers' duty of confidentiality under ethics rules.
A.

The Attorney-Client Privilege

The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest common law
privileges protecting confidential communications,17 and it has now been
widely codified. The privilege is intended to "ensure full disclosure by
clients who feel safe confiding in their attorney."' 18 Only full and frank
communications between clients and their attorneys allow attorneys to
provide effective, expeditious and informed representation.19
Additionally, recognizing the privilege encourages the public to seek
early legal assistance.20
The leading privilege test was announced years ago in United States
v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.2' The United Shoe test provides that the
privilege applies if:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is the
member of the bar of court, on his subordinate and (b) in connection
with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the- communication
relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing
primarily either (i) an opinion of law or (ii) legal services or
(iii) assistance in some legal preceding, and not (d) for the propose of
committing a crime or tort; and 22
(4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.
Although the United Shoe test implies that the privilege covers only
communications from the client to the attorney, that is not the case;
confidential communications from an attorney to a client are also
17. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998); see also Wemark
v. State, 602 N.W.2d 810, 815 (Iowa 1999); In re Miller, 584 S.E.2d 772, 782 (N.C.
2003); Doe v. Maret, 984 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1999).
18. Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., Inc., 640 N.W.2d 788, 798 (Wis. 2002).
19. See In re Miller, 584 S.E.2d at 782-83 (quoting and citing cases).
20. McLaughlin v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 850 A.2d 254, 258 (Conn. App. Ct.
2004); Genova v. Longs Peak Emergency Physicians, P.C., 72 P.3d 454, 461-62 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Dist. Court, 718 P.2d
1044, 1047 (Colo. 1986)).
21. 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
22. In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (quoting United
Shoe and In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 1979)).
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privileged.23 Both clients and lawyers are "privileged persons. 24
The right to assert the privilege belongs to the client; 25 the privilege
exists for the client's benefit. 26 The privilege attaches to initial
consultations between prospective clients and attorneys, even if the
attorney is not ultimately retained.27 Thereafter, the client may invoke
the privilege at any time during the attorney-client relationship, or after
the relationship terminates. The privilege even survives the client's
death.2 8
There is no blanket privilege covering all attorney-client
communications. 29 The client must claim the privilege with respect to
each communication at issue, and a court examining a party's privilege
claims must scrutinize each communication independently. 0 The party
asserting the privilege bears the burden of establishing its application to
particular communications. 31 The form of the communication is
irrelevant to privilege analysis so long as the communication is intended
to be confidential; it is the act of communicating that counts. For
example, e-mails may be privileged,32 even if they are not encrypted.33
23. Lewis v. UNUM Corp. Severance Plan, 203 F.R.D. 615, 618 (D. Kan. 2001)
(discussing federal common law attorney-client privilege); Byrd v. State, 929 S.W.2d
151, 154 (Ark. 1996); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 730 A.2d 51, 60
(Conn. 1999); Clausen v. Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 730 A.2d 133, 137-38 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1997); Squealer Feeds v. Pickering, 530 N.W.2d 678, 684 (Iowa 1995); Rent Control
Bd. v. Praught, 619 N.E.2d 346, 350 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); Palmer v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 861 P.2d 895, 906 (Mont. 1993); Boyd v. Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203,
213 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 (2000)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
25. OXY Resources Cal. LLC v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 644-45 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2004); Boyd, 88 S.W.3d at 213.
26. State ex reL Polytech, Inc. v. Voorhees, 895 S.W.2d 13, 14 (Mo. 1995).
27. Barton v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1104,
1111 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying California law); State v. Fodor, 880 P.2d 662, 669 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1994); Popp v. O'Neil, 730 N.E.2d 506, 511 (111. App. Ct. 2000); Lovell v.
Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Ky. 1997); Gay v. Luihn Food Sys., Inc., No. CLOO121, 2001 WL 103883, at **3-4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 7, 2001).
28. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 405 (1998); see also In re
Miller, 584 S.E.2d 772, 779 (N.C. 2003) (collecting state court cases on this point).
29. Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 197 (Colo. 2001).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 198; see also Lewis v. UNUM Corp. Severance Plan, 203 F.R.D. 615, 618
(D. Kan. 2001) (discussing federal law); Pietro v. Marriott Senior Living Servs., Inc., 810
N.E.2d 217, 226 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); St. Luke Hosps., Inc. v. Kopowski, 160 S.W.3d
771, 775 (Ky. 2005); In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex.
2004); Via v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 583, 594 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 370 S.E.2d 296, 301 (Va. 1988)); State ex rel Brison v.
Kaufman, 584 S.E.2d 480, 488 (W. Va. 2003) (quoting syllabus point from earlier case);
State v. Meeks, 666 N.W.2d 859, 865 (Wis. 2003).
32. Baptiste v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., No. 03Civ.2102(RCC)(THK), 2004 WL
330235, at * *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2004); Blumenthal v. Kimber Mfg. Co., 826 A.2d
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A party seeking to protect a written or electronic communication
from discovery does not have to identify it as "privileged" or
"confidential" for the attorney-client privilege to attach.34 On the other
hand, a party cannot shield a communication from discovery simply by
branding it "confidential" or "privileged. 3 5 The test for determining
privilege is always whether a communication satisfies the elements
necessary to establish the privilege, not how it is identified or labeled.
A corporation is entitled to assert the attorney-client privilege,36 as
is a partnership.37 Organizations may claim the privilege with respect to
communications with in-house counsel.38 In the corporate context, the
most common problem is determining who among the corporation's
employees speaks on its behalf. Courts have traditionally applied two
tests to analyze corporate privilege claims: the "control group" test and
the "subject matter" test. A few courts have adopted a third test that
closely tracks the subject matter test.39
Under the control group test, the communication must be made by
an employee who is in a position "to control or take a substantial part in
the determination of corporate action in response to legal advice" for the
privilege to attach.4 ° Only these employees qualify as the "client" for
attorney-client privilege purposes. 4 1 Thus, the control group test
essentially limits the application of the privilege to communications
1088, 1096-1101 (Conn. 2003); City of Reno v. Reno Police Protective Ass'n, 59 P.3d
1212, 1218 (Nev. 2002).
33. In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247,256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
34. See Baptiste, 2004 WL 330235, at **1-2 (rejecting argument that failure to label
e-mail as privileged deprived it of privileged status); Blumenthal, 826 A.2d at 1098
(discussing e-mail and stating: "Whether a document expressly is marked as
"confidential" is not dispositive, but is merely one factor a court may consider in
determining confidentiality."); Chrysler Corp. v. Sheridan, No. 227511, 2001 WL
773099, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. July 10, 2001) (involving the inadvertent disclosure of an
e-mail that was not identified as "privileged" or "confidential").
35. Blumenthal, 826 A.2d at 1098; cf.Ledgin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan.
City, 166 F.R.D. 496, 499 (D. Kan. 1996) (describing a party's document stamp of
"attorney work product" as a "self-serving embellishment" that did not preclude
discovery).
36. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985).
37. See, e.g., In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1994) (discussing the
applicability of the attorney-client privilege in the partnership context).
38. See, e.g., Premiere Digital Access, Inc. v. Cent. Tel. Co., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1168,
1174-75 (D. Nev. 2005) (finding that privilege applied to in-house lawyer's e-mail
communications to others in his company under both Nevada and federal law); Fla.
Marlins Baseball Club, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 900 So. 2d 720,
721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that in-house lawyer was providing legal advice,
not business advice, and thus upholding privilege claim).
39. See In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d at 935-36.
40. EDNA S. EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 100 (4th ed. 2001).
41. Id.
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between a member of senior management and an attorney. The control
group test has been severely criticized because (1) it has a chilling effect
on corporate communications, (2) it frustrates the very purpose of the
privilege by discouraging subordinate employees from communicating
important information to corporate counsel, (3) it makes it difficult for
corporate counsel to properly advise their clients and to ensure their
42
clients' compliance with the law, and (4) it yields unpredictable results.
Nonetheless, a few jurisdictions still adhere to this test. 3
Under the subject matter test, a communication with an employee of
any rank may be privileged if (1) it is made for the purpose of securing
legal advice for the corporation, (2) the employee is communicating at a
superior's request or direction, and (3) the employee's responsibilities
include the subject matter of the communication. a The subject matter
test also includes a "need to know" element; that is, the communication
must not be disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the
corporate structure, need to know its contents.4a
The third test is essentially indistinguishable from the subject matter
test. This test is commonly referred to as the "modified Harper & Row
test," or the "Diversified Industries test," after the cases from which it
derives, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,4 6 and Diversified
Industries,Inc. v. Meredith.4 7 Under this test:
The attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's
communication if (1) the communication was made for the purpose
of securing legal advice; (2) the employee making the
communication did so at the direction of his corporate superior;
(3) the superior made the request so that the corporation could secure
legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication is within
the scope of the employee's corporate duties; and (5) the
communication is not disseminated beyond those persons
who,
48
because of the corporate structure, need to know its contents.
The modified Harper& Row or DiversifiedIndustries test was crafted as
an alternative to the subject matter test in order to focus more on why the
42. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391-93 (1981).
43. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 256-58
(Il1. 1982) (reasoning that control group test strikes a reasonable balance by protecting
consultation with counsel by decision makers or those who substantially influence
corporate decisions while minimizing amount of relevant factual information that is
shielded from discovery).
44. EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 100.
45. See S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1383 (Fla. 1994).
46. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
47. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
48. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 936 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Diversified Indus.,
Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977)).
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attorney was consulted, as well as to prevent the routine routing of
information through counsel to prevent later disclosure.49
With respect to partnerships, it is generally the rule that all partners
are considered the client in all attorney-client communications involving
partnership affairs. 50 Employees of the partnership may serve as its
agents for purposes of making privileged communications. 51 Whether an
employee's communications with partnership counsel are in fact
privileged is determined by any of the tests applied to corporations.52
Courts narrowly construe the attorney-client privilege because it
limits full disclosure of the truth. 53 For example, the privilege ordinarily
does not protect a client's identity,54 as illustrated by recent cases in
which courts compelled law firms to reveal the identities of clients who
participated in aggressive tax avoidance strategies.55 Similarly, the
privilege does not shield the mere fact that an attorney-client relationship
exists, the date of its commencement, the general nature of the services
for which the attorney was retained, or the terms and conditions of the
attorney's engagement. 56 While the privilege protects the content of an
attorney-client communication from disclosure, it does not protect the

49.

Deason, 632 So. 2dat 1383 n.10.

50.

1 PAUL R. RICE ET AL., ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES

§ 4.49, at 266 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing general partnerships and distinguishing limited
partnerships).
51. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 73 cmt. d.
52. See In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d at 935-40 (applying modified Harper & Row test in
case involving a partnership).
53. PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 838 A.2d 135, 167 (Conn.
2004); In re Bryan, 61 P.3d 641, 656 (Kan. 2003); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Forma-Pack, Inc., 718 A.2d 1129, 1138 (Md. 1998); Whitehead v. Nev. Comm'n on
Judicial Discipline, 873 P.2d 946, 968 (Nev. 1994); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated
June 30, 2003, 770 N.Y.S.2d 568, 572 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003); Callahan v. Nystedt, 641
A.2d 58, 61 (R.I. 1994); Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., Inc., 640 N.W.2d 788, 798 (Wis.
2002) (quoting cases).
54. United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting,
however, that "the identity of a client may be privileged in the rare circumstance when so
much of an actual confidential communication has been disclosed already that merely
identifying the client will effectively disclose that communication"); United States v.
Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting three exceptions to this rule, all related
to criminal consequences for the client); Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. La. Forum Corp., 538
S.E.2d 441, 444-45 (Ga. 2000) (noting two exceptions to this rule: (1) where identifying
the client may expose the client to criminal liability for acts previously committed about
which the client consulted the attorney; and (2) where disclosure of the client's identity
would reveal the substance of confidential attorney-client communications).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., No. 03 5693, 2004 WL
870824, at * 1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2004) (Moran, J.); United States v. Sidley Austin Brown
& Wood LLP, No. 03 C 9355, 2004 WL 816448, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2004)
(Kennelly, J.).
56. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603 (8th Cir. 1977)
(rejecting privilege claim related to law firm memorandum).
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facts communicated from disclosure.17 Nor does the privilege shield
from discovery communications generated or received by an attorney
acting in some other capacity, or communications in which an attorney is
giving business advice rather than legal advice. 8
The attorney-client privilege is not absolute, 59 and it may be waived
either voluntarily or by implication. 60 The burden of establishing a
waiver generally is borne by the party seeking to overcome the
privilege, 61 although some courts hold that that the party asserting the
privilege bears the burden of establishing that it has not been waived.62
The most difficult cases, of course, are those involving implied waivers;
case law affords little guidance for courts or lawyers in terms of how
broadly implied waivers sweep.63
B.

The Work ProductDoctrine

"The attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine are
separate and distinct., 64 Unlike the attorney-client privilege, which is the
client's to assert, it is commonly said that the lawyer holds work product
immunity.65 In fact, both the lawyer and the client hold work product
immunity, and either may assert it to avoid discovery.66 Similarly, either
the client or the lawyer may
waive work product immunity, although
67
only with respect to himself.
The protection afforded by work product immunity is broader than
that conferred by the attorney-client privilege.6 8 Work product immunity
57.
58.

Mackey v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 186,200 (D. Kan. 1996).
1 RICE ET AL., supra note 50, § 7.1, at 7, 11.

59. Genova v,Longs Peak Emergency Physicians, P.C., 72 P.3d 454, 462 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2003); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 623 A.2d 1118, 112122 (Del. 1994); Newman v. State, 863 A.2d 321, 331 (Md. 2004); Ross v. Med. Univ. of
S.C., 453 S.E.2d 880, 884-85 (S.C. 1994); State v. Aquino-Cervantes, 945 P.2d 767, 771
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
60. United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 684 (1st Cir. 1997).
61. Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 198 (Colo. 2001); State ex rel. Med. Assurance
of W. Va., Inc. v. Recht, 583 S.E.2d 80, 89 (W. Va. 2003).
62. See, e.g., In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 255 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2005); Lewis v. UNUM Corp. Severance Plan, 203 F.R.D. 615, 621 (D. Kan. 2001); Iron
Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 582, 590
(N.D. Ohio 1999).
63. In re Keeper of the Records, 348 F.3d 16, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2003).
64. Elkton Care Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Quality Care Mgmt., Inc., 805 A.2d
1177, 1183 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
65. OXY Res. Cal. LLC v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 645 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004); Clausen v. Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 730 A.2d 133, 138 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997).
66. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 924 n.15 (8th Cir.
1997).
67. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1994).
68. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289,
304 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 163 (6th Cir.
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is not limited, as is the attorney-client privilege, to confidential
communications between an attorney and a client. The work product
doctrine protects lawyers' effective trial preparation by immunizing
certain information and materials from discovery, including materials
prepared by attorneys' agents and consultants. 69 The doctrine is rooted
in the desire to foreclose unwarranted inquiries into attorneys' files and
mental impressions in the guise of liberal discovery.7 °
There are two categories or types of attorney work product: "fact"
or "ordinary" work product-better described as "tangible" work
product-and "opinion" or "core" work product-sometimes termed
"intangible" work product. To qualify as tangible work product, the
material sought to be protected must be a document or tangible thing
prepared by or for a party, or by or for the party's representative, in
anticipation of litigation.7 Opinion work product refers to an attorney's
conclusions, legal theories, mental impressions, or opinions.72
The work product doctrine is codified in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(3) and its state counterparts. Rule 26(b)(3) provides, in
pertinent part:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party
may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or
for that other party's representative (including the other party's
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon
a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of
the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials
when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of an 73
attorney or other representative of a party
litigation.
the
concerning
As with the attorney-client privilege, work product protection is not
absolute.74 As Rule 26(b)(3) makes clear, a party may discover its
1986)); Frank W. Schaefer, Inc. v. C. Garfield Mitchell Agency, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 442,

446-47 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
69. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 2003) (protecting
communications with party's trial strategy and deposition preparation consultant).
70. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
71. FEDR. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
72. State ex rel. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. O'Malley, 898 S.W.2d
550, 552 (Mo. 1995); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 568.
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
74. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 663 (3d Cir. 2003).
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adversary's tangible work product if it demonstrates substantial need of
the materials to prepare its case, and it is unable without undue hardship
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.75
The discovering party must specifically explain its need for the materials
sought. 76 Whether immunity for tangible work product will be abrogated
in a given case typically depends on available alternative sources of the
information sought, the parties' relative resources, and the need to
protect the target party's expectation of confidentiality.7 7
Opinion work product, on the other hand, receives almost absolute
protection against discovery. 78 To discover an adversary's opinion work
product, a party must demonstrate something far greater than the
substantial need and undue hardship necessary to obtain tangible work
product.79 Opinion work product is discoverable only if the attorneys'
conclusions, mental impressions or opinions are at issue in the case, and
there is a compelling need for their discovery.80 The circumstances in
which these requirements are met are exceptionally rare. 81 Additionally,
a court that allows the discovery of a lawyer's tangible work product
must be careful to ensure that allowing its discovery does not expose the
lawyer's opinion work product to discovery.82 There is, for example, a
significant difference between a witness's statement and an attorney's
notes concerning that statement, the latter being strictly protected opinion
work product because the notes may83 contain the attorney's mental
impressions or reflect her case theories.
In contrast to the attorney-client privilege, which is not limited to
communications about litigation,84 information must be generated or
prepared "in anticipation of litigation" to qualify as work product.85
75. In contrast, communications protected by the attorney-client privilege do not
become discoverable by virtue of the fact that the party seeking them is unable to obtain
the information from other sources. St. Luke Hosps., Inc. v. Kopowski, 160 S.W.3d 771,
776-77 (Ky. 2005).
76.

EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 550.

77. Id. at 567.
78. In re Cendant Corp., 343 F.3d at 663 (quoting In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d
954, 962 n.7 (3d Cir. 1997)).
79. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
80. See Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir.
1992).
81.

In re Cendant Corp., 343 F.3d at 663.

82. State ex reL Ford Motor Co. v. Westbrooke, 151 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Mo. 2004)
(quoting Mo. SuP. CT. R. 56.01(b)(3)); LaPorta v. Gloucester County Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders, 774 A.2d 545, 548 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (quoting Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)).
83. Giannicos v. Bellevue Hosp. Med. Ctr., 793 N.Y.S.2d 893, 896 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2005).
84. In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch., 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App. 1999).
85. Save Sunset Beach Coalition v. City of Honolulu, 78 P.3d 1, 20 (Haw. 2003);
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Documents prepared in the ordinary course of business, or that would
have been prepared regardless of whether litigation was anticipated, are
not entitled to work product immunity.86 It is "not necessary that
litigation be threatened or imminent, as long as the prospect of litigation
is identifiable because of claims that have already arisen. '87 Some courts
state the "anticipation of litigation" requirement a bit differently, holding
that work product immunity attaches only if there is "a substantial
probability that litigation will ensue. ' '88
Of course, it may be that materials claimed to be work product were
prepared for more than one purpose. In this situation, some jurisdictions
require a court to discern "the primary motivating purpose" behind the
documents' creation. 89 "If the primary motivating purpose is other than
to assist in pending or impending litigation," then the materials are not
protected as work product. 90 Other jurisdictions have abandoned the
primary motivating purpose test for a "because of" test. 9' Applying this
test, "the work product doctrine can reach documents prepared 'because
of litigation' even if they were prepared in connection with a business
transaction or also served a business purpose. 9 2
Whether one test is better than the other arguably depends on the
parties' perspectives in any given case. The "because of' test affords
broader protection against discovery; therefore, it is more consistent with
and supportive of the purposes underlying work product immunity. To
the extent courts have the ability to select between the two approaches,
the "because of' test represents the better alternative.
Finally, work product immunity extends to subsequent litigation.9 3
Wichita Eagle & Beacon Pub. Co. v. Simmons, 50 P.3d 66, 85 (Kan. 2002); Miller v. J.B.
Hunt Transp., Inc., 770 A.2d 1288, 1291-93 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); State ex
rel. Brandenburg v. Blackmer, 110 P.3d 66, 69 (N.M. 2005). But see Laguna Beach
County Water Dist. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 387, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(explaining that California law imposes no "anticipation of litigation" requirement).
86. In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
87. Nat'l Tank Co. v. 30th Judicial Dist. Court, 851 S.W.2d 193, 205 (Tex. 1993).
88. Wichita Eagle & Beacon, 50 P.3d at 85.
89. In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 90 Civ. 1260 (SS), 1993 WL 561125, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1993) (quoting cases); Ex Parte Cryer, 814 So. 2d 239, 247 (Ala.
2001) (quoting cases); Heffron v. Dist. Court of Okla. County, 77 P.3d 1069, 1079 (Okla.
2003); Arnold v. City of Chattanooga, 19 S.W.3d 779, 784 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
90. In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 1993 WL 561125, at *3.
91. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v.
Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998); Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96
F.3d 971, 976-77 (7th Cir. 1996); Martin v. Bally's Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d
1252, 1258 (3d Cir. 1993); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967
F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d
1065, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Am. Indus. Refrigeration, Inc., 690
N.W.2d 38, 48 (Iowa 2004).
92. Chevron Texaco, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.
93. Frontier Ref, Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 703 (10th Cir. 1998);
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If information was created in anticipation of litigation with respect to
Case A and otherwise meets all of the work product criteria, it remains
immune from discovery in Case B. Although there is some debate about
whether the subsequent litigation must be closely related to the original
litigation for work product immunity to attach in the second case, courts
have generally avoided drawing this distinction, and those courts that
have addressed the issue have not required a close relationship between
94
the cases.
C. Lawyers' EthicalDuty of Confidentiality
"It is axiomatic that among the highest duties an attorney owes a
95
client is the duty to maintain the confidentiality of client information."
Lawyers' duty to maintain client confidences is a fundamental agency
law principle. 96 The duty is further found in ethics rules. For example,
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(a) states that a lawyer "shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the
client gives informed consent, the disclosure is authorized to carry out
the representation or the disclosure is permitted by [Rule 1.6(b)]. 9 7 In
states still adhering to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
lawyers' duty of confidentiality is enforced by way of DR 4-101(B)(1),
which provides, with few exceptions, that a lawyer "shall not
knowingly... reveal a confidence or secret of his client." 98 For DR 4101 purposes, a "confidence" refers to information protected under the
attomey-client privilege, while a secret refers to other information
acquired in the relationship "that the client has requested be held
inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would
likely be detrimental to the client," 99 although some courts define or
interpret these terms differently. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court
has opined that "a 'confidence' is information learned directly from the
client, whereas a 'secret' is defined more broadly."100 In Ohio, a client
"secret" includes not only "embarrassing or detrimental information that
the client reveals," but also detrimental or embarrassing information

Maldonado v. State ex rel. Admin. Office of Courts-Prob. Div., 225 F.R.D. 120, 131
(D.N.J. 2004).
94. See FrontierRef, Inc., 136 F.3d at 703 (citing cases).
95. Commonwealth v. Downey, 793 N.E.2d 377, 381 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).
96. LAWRENCE J. Fox & SUSAN R. MARTYN, RED FLAGS: A LAWYER'S HANDBOOK
ON LEGAL ETHICS 87 (2005).

97. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2004) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
98. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B)(1) (1969) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
99. Id. DR4-101(A).
100. Akron Bar Ass'n v. Holder, 810 N.E.2d 426, 434 (Ohio 2004).
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about the client "available from other sources."' '
Rule 1.6(a) and DR 4-101 are intended to encourage clients to trust
their attorneys and to be candid with them.'0 2 Lawyers' duty of
confidentiality,

although

not absolute, 10 3 is

very broad. 0 4

Any

exceptions the rules provide are narrow.' 05
Lawyers' duty of
confidentiality attaches to initial consultations and preliminary
communications, even if no attorney-client relationship ultimately
results, 10 6 and continues after representation concludes.0 7
Rule 1.6 and DR 4-101 prevent the disclosure of information that is
neither privileged nor work product. 10 8
"Confidential" is not
synonymous with "privileged" or "immune."' 1 9 Thus, a lawyer's duty of
confidentiality prevents her from revealing a client's identity or facts that
a client communicates to her, even though the attorney-client privilege
and work product immunity do not protect them. 110 Moreover, lawyers
are bound by their duty of confidentiality at all times, not just when they
face inquiry from others."'
Lawyers' duty of confidentiality is especially broad in the many
jurisdictions that have enacted versions of Model Rule 1.6(a). In these
jurisdictions a lawyer's duty of confidentiality attaches "not merely to
matters communicated in confidence by the client, but also to ' all12
information relating to the representation, whatever its source."
101. Id.
102. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Schafer, 66 P.3d 1036, 1041 (Wash.
2003).
103. Commonwealth v. Downey, 793 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).
104. In re Bryan, 61 P.3d 641, 656 (Kan. 2003).
105. Id. (discussing Kansas' version of Rule 1.6).
106. Gay v. Luihn Food Sys., Inc., No. CLOO-121, 2001 WL 103883, at *4 (Va. Cir.
Ct. Feb. 7, 2001) (citing and quoting Virginia ethics opinions).
107. Cont'l Res., Inc. v. Schmalenberger, 656 N.W.2d 730, 735 (N.D. 2003); Kala v.
Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 688 N.E.2d 258, 262 (Ohio 1998).
108. See In re Gonzalez, 773 A.2d 1026, 1031 (D.C. 2001) ("An attorney's duty of

confidentiality applies not only to privileged 'confidences,' but also to unprivileged
secrets; it 'exists without regard to the nature or source of the information or the fact that
others share the knowledge."' (quoting Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 800 n.9 (5th Cir.
2000))); Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. La. Forum Corp., 538 S.E.2d 441, 445 (Ga. 2000)
("An attorney's ethical ... duty to maintain client secrets is distinguishable from the
attorney-client privilege.").
109. See Doe v. Md. Bd. of Soc. Workers, 840 A.2d 744, 749 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2004) (explaining that information "can be confidential and, at the same time, nonprivileged," and that "privilege" is the legal protection given to certain communications
and relationships, while "confidential" describes a type of communication or
relationship).
110.

See Fox & MARTYN, supra note 96, at 93.

111. Newman v. State, 863 A.2d 321, 332 (Md. 2004); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v.
McGraw, 461 S.E.2d 850, 860 (W. Va. 1995).
112. State ex reL Okla. Bar Ass'n v. McGee, 48 P.3d 787, 791 (Okla. 2002); see also
State v. Meeks, 666 N.W.2d 859, 868 (Wis. 2003) (same).

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 110:2

Lawyers may breach their duty of confidentiality under Rule 1.6(a) by
revealing information that is available from sources other than their
clients, including public information.' 1 3 In Model Code states, lawyers
are prohibited from revealing public information about a client only if it
constitutes a client secret, that is, the information is detrimental or
embarrassing to the client. 14
III.

Communications with Public Relations Consultants

As numerous recent cases illustrate, parties in high profile civil and
criminal matters often find their cases being tried in the media.
Businesses accused of serious misconduct are especially threatened by
negative media attention. Not surprisingly, litigants and targets of
government inquiries often turn to public relations consultants for
assistance.115

When public relations professionals assist parties in litigation, it is
foreseeable that they will interact with the lawyers representing those
parties, review documents prepared by or for counsel, and participate in
meetings attended by counsel in which legal issues or strategies are
discussed. It is also foreseeable that these activities may expose
otherwise confidential communications to discovery. For example, the
presence of a public relations consultant at a meeting between a senior
executive of a corporation under government investigation and defense
counsel may open that meeting to discovery because, in general, the
presence of a third party to a communication robs it of the confidentiality
that the attorney-client privilege is intended to ensure." 6 On the other
hand, the presence of a third party does not waive the privilege if the
third party is there "to facilitate the effective rendition of legal
services."' 17 Thus, when it comes to the presence of public relations
113.

See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 654 N.E.2d 1128, 1129-30 (Ind. 1995) (holding that

lawyer violated Rule 1.6(a) by revealing information "readily available from public
sources"); McGraw, 461 S.E.2d at 861-62 ("The ethical duty of confidentiality is not
nullified by the fact that the information is part of a public record or by the fact that
someone else is privy to it.").
114. Akron Bar Ass'n v. Holder, 810 N.E.2d 426, 435 (Ohio 2004) (stating that under
DR 4-101, "an attorney is not free to disclose embarrassing or harmful features of a
client's life just because they are documented in public records").
115. See generally In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) ("[D]ealing with the media in a high profile case probably is not a matter for
amateurs.").
116. See Oxyn Telecomms., Inc. v. Onse Telecom, No. 01 Civ. 1012(JSM), 2003 WL
660848, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2003); Lewis v. UNUM Corp. Severance Plan, 203
F.R.D. 615, 620 (D. Kan. 2001); Newman v. State, 863 A.2d 321, 333 (Md. 2004).
117. Oxyn Telecomms., 2003 WL 660848, at *2; see also Newman, 863 A.2d at 33435 (finding no waiver where client's friend attended meeting at attorney's behest to
lessen client's stress and to otherwise aid the attorney's representation of the client).
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consultants at meetings with counsel, privilege law is at best unclear.
Courts routinely hold that communications with public relations
consultants are not privileged. 1 8 For example, in Calvin Klein
Trademark Trust v. Wachner,1 19 the law firm of Boies, Schiller &
Flexner ("Boies") hired a public relations firm, RLM, to provide
communications consulting in connection with Boies' representation of
Calvin Klein, Inc. ("CKI"). When the defendants sought to discover
RLM employee, CKI
various documents from RLM and to depose 1 an
20
refused on privilege and work product grounds.
The court concluded that none of the subject documents were
privileged for at least three reasons. First, the attorney-client privilege
protects communications between a client and its attorney, not
communications that are important to the attorney's legal advice to the
client.1 2 1 The documents given to RLM did not contain or reveal
confidential communications from CKI for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice. The possibility that communications between Boies and RLM
might help Boies formulate legal advice was not sufficient to trigger the
privilege.
Second, even if any of the documents contained privileged
122
communications, their disclosure to RLM waived the privilege.
Rather than serving as a translator, for example, RLM was simply
dispensing public relations advice. RLM's service to Boies consisted of
reviewing press coverage, calling members of the media to comment 1on
23
the litigation, and locating reporters who might treat CKI favorably.
As the court explained:
The possibility that such activity may also have been helpful to
[Boies] in formulating legal strategy is neither here nor there if
RLM's work and advice simply serves to assist counsel in assessing
the probable public reaction to various strategic alternatives, as
opposed to enabling counsel to understand aspects of the client's own
not otherwise be appreciated in the
communications that could
124
advice.
legal
of
rendering
Third, there was no evidence that RLM was performing any

118. See, e.g., Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am., Inc., No. 02 Civ. 7955 DLC,
2003 WL 21998674 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003); Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v.
Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D. 236,
242-43 (D.D.C. 1999).
119. 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
120. Id. at 54.
121. Id. (quoting United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 54-55.
124. Id. at 55.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 110:2

functions that were materially different from those that any ordinary
public relations firm would have performed had it been hired by CKI
instead of Boies. 125 Indeed, when Boies came along, RLM was already
consulting with CKI pursuant to a contract entered into some eight
months earlier.126 "It may be," the court observed, "that the modem
client comes to court as prepared to massage the media as to persuade the
judge[,] but nothing in the client's communications for the former
purpose constitutes
the obtaining of legal advice or justifies a privileged
127
status.'
As for CKI's work product argument, the court observed that most
public relations advice is not protected because the work product
doctrine is intended to protect litigation strategy, not strategy related to
the effects of the litigation on the client's customers, the media, or the
public. 28 Even so, work product immunity is not waived simply because
an attorney provides her work product to a public relations consultant
who the attorney hires and who keeps confidential the work product she
is provided. This is especially so if the public relations consultant needs
to know the attorney's strategy to provide public relations advice and, in
turn, the public relations advice bears on the attorney's own litigation
strategy or tactics. 29 The Calvin Klein court determined that several
categories of documents retained their work product immunity even
though they had been given to RLM. The court ordered CKI to produce
all other documents and to produce the RLM employee for deposition. 1" °
Calvin Klein does not necessarily reflect the majority rule; other
courts have found that communications with public relations consultants
13 2
are privileged. 131 In H. W. Carter& Sons, Inc. v. Wiiliam Carter Co.,
for example, the court held that the presence of a public relations
consultant at a meeting between the defendant and its counsel did not
waive the attorney-client privilege because the consultant "participated to
assist the lawyers in rendering legal advice, which included how [the]
defendant should respond to [the] plaintiffs lawsuit."' 133 The court in In

125. Id.
126. Id. at 54.
127. Id. at 55 (footnote omitted).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 56.
131. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326-32 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Glaxosmithkline, 294 F.3d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002); In re
Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 215-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); H.W. Carter &
Sons, Inc. v. William Carter Co., No. 95 Civ. 1274 (DC), 1995 WL 301351, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1995); In re Monsanto Co., 998 S.W.2d 917, 932 (Tex. App. 1999).
132. No. 95 Civ. 1274 (DC), 1995 WL 301351 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1995).
133. Id. at *3.
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re GrandJury Subpoenas'34 held that:
(1) confidential communications (2) between lawyers and public
relations consultants (3) hired by the lawyers to assist them in dealing
with the media in cases such as this [high profile grand jury
investigation into Martha Stewart's alleged insider trading] (4) that
are made for the purpose of giving or receiving advice (5) directed at
handling the client's
legal problems are protected by the attorney13 5
client privilege.
Based upon existing case law, it is exceptionally difficult to predict
when communications with public relations consultants are privileged.
Courts extend the attorney-client privilege to non-lawyers very rarely,
and even then confine it to its narrowest possible limits. 136 As a result,

only three general statements can safely be made. First, the privilege is
more likely to attach where the lawyer hires the public relations
consultant; 37 conversely, the likelihood of the privilege applying 138
is
diminished where the client hires the public relations consultant.
Second, for the privilege to apply, there must be a clear nexus between
the public relations consultant's work and the attorney's role in
representing the client.' 39 In other words, the client must show that
communications with a public relations consultant were made so that the
client could obtain legal advice from his attorney. 40 If the public
relations consultant was retained for the value of her own advice, the
privilege will not attach.' 4' Third, the privilege is more likely to attach
where a client does not have in-house public relations capabilities, or the
client is a foreign corporation unfamiliar with the United States legal
system, such that the public relations consultant can
be fairly equated
42
with the client for the purpose of privilege analysis.
134. 265 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
135. Id. at 331.
136. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D. 236, 243 (D.D.C. 1999) (quoting Linde
Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 5 F.3d 1508,
1514 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
137. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
138. See, e.g., Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 54-55
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (involving public relations consultant working for client when hired by
law firm).
139. See Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am., Inc., No. 02 Civ. 7955 DLC, 2003
WL 21998674, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003).
140. Id.
141. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D. 236, 243 (D.D.C. 1999).
142. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (involving public relations consultants who "acted as part of a team with full-time
employees" of the defendant); In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 217220 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (involving a Japanese corporation and public relations consultant
that was essentially incorporated into the corporation's staff to perform a corporate
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Because this area of privilege law is uncertain, lawyers who engage
public relations consultants to aid their clients, or who must work with
public relations consultants employed by media savvy clients, should
assume that their communications with those consultants, as well as their
clients' communications with the consultants, will not be privileged. As
a result, any important communications with public relations
professionals should be verbal rather than written, or embodied in emails. This reduces the risk that confidential communications will be
discovered. The only documents that should be given to public relations
consultants are those that are public records-pleadings, annual reports,
and documents filed with regulatory bodies-and those that the lawyer
expects to be discovered in litigation.
Work product law in the area of public relations consultants is much
more settled. 143 Even courts that have declined to extend the attorneyclient privilege to communications with public relations consultants have
denied discovery based on the work product doctrine.144 For work
product immunity to attach to communications with a public relations
consultant (1) the communications must be made in anticipation of
litigation, (2) the consultant must keep the communications confidential,
and (3) the public1 45relations strategy must bear on the attorney's own
litigation strategy.
IV.

Communications with Auditors

The Securities and Exchange Commission requires public
companies to file an annual form 10-K, which includes a financial
statement certified by an accountant functioning as an independent
auditor. 146 In auditing a company's financial statements, an auditor must
determine whether the company's financial statements, viewed as a
whole, fairly represent its financial condition and performance in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 147 Among the
factors that an auditor considers are whether the company has adequate
reserves for claims against it, and whether there are material claims
known to the company that are as yet unasserted. 48 Because auditors
function).
143. See Bernstein & Harvey, supra note 13, at 1257 ("Greater consensus exists with
respect to the work product doctrine.").
144. See, e.g., Haugh, 2003 WL 219984, at **4-5; Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v.
Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 55-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
145. See Calvin Klein, 198 F.R.D. at 54-55.
146. John K. Villa, Audit Letter Responses in the Wake of Sarbanes-Oxley, ACC
DOCKET, Oct. 2003, at 164, 165 (on file with the author).
147. Kenneth B. Winer & Scott Seabolt, Responding to Audit Inquiries in a Time of
HeightenedPeril,36 SEC. REG. & LAW REP. BNA 1902, 1903 (2004).
148. Villa, supra note 146, at 165.
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ordinarily lack the ability to make legal judgments, they attempt to gather
information about claims by having the company write its regular outside
counsel and ask counsel to write an audit response letter describing and
evaluating claims that they are handling or are expecting to be
asserted. 149 Lawyers' responses to auditors' inquiries have come to be
known as "audit response letters" or "FASB 5 letters,"' 150 the former term
typically used by lawyers and the latter term employed by accountants.
In some cases, accountants learn of matters that a company's lawyers are
handling outside of the audit letter process.'15 Regardless, lawyers must
always be concerned that communications with clients' independent
auditors may waive the attorney-client privilege or work product
immunity.
Lawyers answer auditors' inquiries in standard audit letter responses
adhering to the so-called "treaty" between the ABA and the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 152
Absent unusual
circumstances, conformity with the treaty's requirements means that
lawyers' audit response letters do not waive the attorney-client privilege
or work product immunity. 5 3 Whether this principle remains true after
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002154 is a hot topic 155
in
professional liability circles and is beyond the scope of this article;
nevertheless, the effect that lawyers' communications with clients'
accountants may have on the attorney-client
privilege and work product
156
immunity is a critical current issue.
As a rule, the disclosure of privileged information to a client's
outside auditor waives the attorney-client privilege. 157 This is because
149. Winer & Seabolt, supra note 147, at 1903.
150. Villa, supra note 146, at 165.
151. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 7689(HB),
2004 WL 2389822, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2004) (describing communications between
outside auditor and company's director of internal audit that led to attorneys' work
product being given to outside auditor).
152. Am. Bar Ass'n, Statement of Policy RegardingLawyers' Responses to Auditor's
Requests for Information, 31 Bus. LAW. 1709 (1976).
153. Villa, supra note 146, at 166.
154. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
155. For practical discussions of this issue, see Villa, supra note 146; Winer &
Seabolt, supra note 147.
156. LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, THE AUDITOR'S NEED FOR ITS CLIENT'S DETAILED
INFORMATION VS. THE CLIENT'S NEED TO PRESERVE THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
AND WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION: THE DEBATE, THE PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSED

SOLUTIONS 1-3 (Corp. Couns. Consortium 2004) [hereinafter THE AUDITOR'S NEED] (on
file with the author).
157. Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992); Ferko v.
Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 125, 134 (E.D. Tex. 2003); In re
Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 90 Civ. 1260 (SS), 1993 WL 561125, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23,
1993); Chinn v. Endocare, Inc., No. Civ.A. 20262, 2003 WL 21517869, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Ct. July 1, 2003).
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the disclosure of information to a client's outside accountant "destroys
the confidentiality seal required of communications protected by the
attorney-client privilege, notwithstanding that the federal securities laws
require an independent audit."' 158 Indeed, it is generally the case that
disclosure of confidential communications to a third party waives the
attorney-client privilege, and there is no obvious reason to abrogate this
rule in the context of attorneys' communications with clients' outside
auditors. 159
Assuming that the attorney-client privilege does not attach to
lawyers' communications with clients' outside auditors, what about the
160
effect of these communications on the work product doctrine?
Disclosures to third parties do not automatically waive work product
immunity.' 61 Courts are split on this issue. 162 Medinol, Ltd. v. Boston
16 4
Scientific Corp.163 and Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc.,
are representative cases on opposite sides of the waiver issue decided by
different courts in the same federal judicial district.
In Medinol, the plaintiff, Medinol, sued Boston Scientific in a
license dispute. That dispute led Boston Scientific to terminate the
employment of a number of executives, to engage counsel to conduct an
internal investigation, and to report the investigation and its results to a
special litigation committee of its board of directors. 165 Minutes of
meetings of that committee were shown to Boston Scientific's outside
public accountants, Ernst & Young, in connection with their audit of the
company's financial statement. 166 Medinol sought to discover the
minutes shown to Ernst & Young, and Boston Scientific resisted on work
product grounds. In resolving the dispute in Medinol's favor, the court
began by observing:

158. In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 1993 WL 561125, at *7.
159. See EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 185 (noting that sharing communications with
"third parties who are not agents of the attorney for purposes of assisting the attorney in
giving legal advice negates the requisite element that confidentiality attend the making of
the communication for the privilege to attach").
160. See Ferko, 218 F.R.D. at 136 ("Courts ordinarily apply the work-product
doctrine only after deciding that the attorney-client privilege does not apply.").
161. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 2000); see, e.g., Gutter
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 95-CV-2152, 1998 WL 2017926, at *5 (S.D. Fla.
May 18, 1998) (finding that work product immunity attached to lawyers' letters to
client's outside auditors).
162. See Laguna Beach County Water Dist. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 387,
392 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that federal courts are split on this issue before holding
that disclosure to auditor does not waive work product immunity).
163. 214F.R.D. 113(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
164. No. 02 Civ. 7689(HB), 2004 WL 2389822 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2004).
165. Medinol, 214 F.R.D. at 114.
166. Id.
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While in some cases disclosure to accountants does not waive the
protections of the work product doctrine, there is a difference
between disclosure to accountants who have been retained by a
lawyer to understand technical aspects of a case and whose interests
are therefore allied with the client, and outside auditors who, in order
to be effective, must have interests that are independent of and not
always aligned with those of the company.167
The Medinol court acknowledged that work product immunity is not
waived where a party shares confidential information with a third party
168
who is aligned in interest or who shares common litigation objectives.
On the other side of that coin, sharing confidential information with a
party whose interests are not aligned or who does not have common
litigation objectives is a waiver. 169 The issue, then, was how to classify
Ernst & Young. The court placed the accounting firm in the second
camp, reasoning:
Customarily, [m]anagement asks counsel who represent it in its
lawsuits to make the relevant disclosures to the auditor and express
opinions about exposures and probable outcomes....
The
independent auditor, however, must come to his own understanding
of reasonableness, based on the evidence. The auditor's review
supports the auditor's independent opinion about the fairness of the
company's financial reports, not the audited company's litigation
interests. Thus, the auditor's interests are not necessarily aligned
with the interests of the company. And, as has become crystal clear
in the face of the many accounting scandals that have arisen as of
late, in order for auditors to properly do their job,
they must not share
170
common interests with the company they audit.
Ernst & Young reviewed the minutes of the meetings of Boston
Scientific's special litigation committee in its role as the company's
auditor. Accordingly, Ernst & Young's interests were not aligned with
Boston Scientific's interests. 171 Although sharing the minutes with the
accountants did not significantly increase the risk that they would come
into adversaries' hands, it did not serve any litigation purpose, nor did it
serve a policy reason supporting work product immunity.1 72 Thus, the
Medinol court concluded, the minutes were not protected by the work
product doctrine, and the plaintiff was entitled to discover them.' 73
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

115.
115-16 (footnote omitted).
116.
117.
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74
The court in Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc.,'
reached a different conclusion. In that case, Merrill Lynch investigated
the criminal behavior of one of its energy traders, Gordon, through its inhouse legal staff and outside counsel. That investigation culminated in
two written reports.175 In response to public reports of the theft, the lead
client services partner at Deloitte & Touche, Merrill Lynch's outside
auditor, spoke with Merrill Lynch's internal audit head, McDermott,
76
about Gordon's conduct and Merrill Lynch's subsequent actions.1
McDermott gave the investigative reports to Deloitte & Touche to help it
identify potential internal control, accounting, or audit issues of which it
was not otherwise aware through the audit process.1 77 McDermott
provided the reports to Deloitte & Touche with the understanding that
they were prepared by counsel and were therefore privileged, that
Deloitte & Touche would keep them confidential, and that Deloitte &
Touche would disclose them to no one. 78 Allegheny later sought to
discover the reports in litigation arising out of a transaction allegedly
affected by Gordon's conduct. Merrill Lynch conceded that by giving
the reports to Deloitte & Touche it waived the attorney-client privilege
with respect to them, but contended that
they were protected from
79
1
doctrine.
product
work
the
by
discovery
Allegheny did not dispute that the reports were work product; it
contended that Merrill Lynch waived work product immunity when it
provided them to Deloitte & Touche.180 The Merrill Lynch court
disagreed, framing "the critical inquiry" as whether "Deloitte & Touche
should be conceived of as an adversary or a conduit to a potential
adversary."'' 81 Deloitte & Touche was neither of those things in the
court's view, and further, it was largely aligned in interest with Merrill
Lynch. 82 As the court explained:

[A]ny tension between an auditor and a corporation that arises from
an auditor's need to scrutinize and investigate a corporation's records
and book-keeping practices simply is not the equivalent of an
adversarial relationship contemplated by the work product doctrine.
Nor should it be. A business and its auditor can and should be
aligned insofar as they both seek to prevent, detect, and root out
corporate fraud. Indeed, this is precisely the type of limited alliance
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

No. 02 Civ. 7689(HB), 2004 WL 2389822 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2004).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at*6.
Id.
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that courts should encourage.183

Moreover, as the court intuitively observed, construing a company's
auditor as an adversary, and thus obliterating the work product doctrine
in these circumstances, "could very well discourage corporations from
conducting a critical self-analysis 1' and
sharing the fruits of such an
84
inquiry with the appropriate actors."
The court recognized the argument that shielding the reports from
Allegheny might be seen as lessening auditors' independence, but easily
rejected it, stating:
This conclusion does not necessarily mean that auditors will be any
less independent.... Instead, the aim should be for corporations to
share information with their auditors to facilitate a meaningful review
and, ultimately, the availability of more accurate information for the
investing public. It is also important to encourage complete
disclosure between a company and its auditor, so that auditors are not
inadvertently shielded from complete frankness by corporate
management, so that they can later claim that they had no knowledge
of alleged malfeasance.
The court found that Allegheny was not entitled to discover Merrill
Lynch's two internal reports. 86 The fact that Merrill Lynch and Deloitte
& Touche87 were not adversaries defeated Allegheny's waiver
argument.
The court in In re Raytheon Securities Litigation'88 took a slightly
different approach, although one generally consistent with that taken by
the Medinol court. With respect to attorneys' audit response letters, the
court concluded that "[t]o the extent the information in these letters must
be disclosed in the public financial statements of the company being
audited, it is not entitled to work product protection" even under the
broadest measure of that immunity.189 As for documents that lawyers
prepare and later share with auditors to assist the auditors in their work,
such sharing may waive work product protection if securities laws or
accounting rules mandate public disclosure of the information they
contain.190 Courts probably will be required to view such documents in
camera to determine "the scope of litigation information an independent
auditor or audited company can reasonably be expected to disclose in
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *8.
Id.
218 F.R.D. 354 (D. Mass. 2003).
Id. at 359.
See id. at 360.
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'9
public financial reports."' 1
In summary, the confidentiality of communications with auditors is
an unsettled aspect of the work product doctrine. Most of the decisions
on the subject have been rendered by district courts and, therefore, lack
precedential value.' 92 Lawyers wishing to improve the chances that the
disclosure of information to auditors will not waive work product
immunity should condition disclosure on the auditor's promise to keep
the information confidential. 93 Auditors should further be required to
inform the client or the lawyers of attempts to discover the information
so that the client or the lawyers can resist discovery if they so choose.

V.

Selective Waiver

Clients can voluntarily waive the attorney-client privilege. When a
client voluntary waives the privilege, the waiver encompasses not only
the disclosed communication, but further extends to "whatever additional
communications must be provided to the third party to give that party a
fair chance to meet the advantages gained by the privilege holder through
the disclosure."'' 94 Courts do not permit "selective waiver" of the
privilege; they do not allow a party to waive only those communications
that are favorable95to its case and resist disclosure of communications that
are unfavorable. 1

This traditional view of selective waiver has been expanded, such
that the situation or scenario described above is best described as "partial
waiver."' 196 "Selective waiver," as that term is commonly understood
today, refers to a situation in which a client reveals confidential
197
communications to one outsider while withholding them from another.
The typical situation is one in which a company is facing a government
inquiry and, as part of that inquiry, either wishes to reveal privileged or
immune information to the government, or is arguably compelled to do
so. At the same time, the company is facing pending or imminent civil
litigation arising out of the same set of facts that spawned the
191.

Id.

192.

See FutureSource LLC v. Reuters Ltd., 312 F.3d 281, 283 (7th Cir. 2002)

(stating that "[tihe reasoning of district judges is of course entitled to respect, but the
decision of a district judge cannot be a controlling precedent").
193.

See Merrill Lynch, 2004 WL 2389822, at *1.

194. 2 RiCE ET AL., supra note 50, § 9:79, at 357-58.
195.

Id. at 361; see also Westinghouse

Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines,

951 F.2d 1414, 1423 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991) (describing this approach as "partial waiver" and
explaining that "[p]artial waiver permits a client who has disclosed a portion of
privileged communications to continue asserting the privilege as to the remaining
portions of the same communications").
196.
197.

See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1423 n.7.
See United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681,685 (lst Cir. 1997).
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government inquiry. The company believes that it must waive the
privilege or work product immunity as to the government; however, the
plaintiffs in the civil litigation then will use the information revealed to
the government to great advantage. Thus, the company attempts to
selectively waive the privilege or immunity, producing otherwise
privileged or immune information to the government, perhaps
accompanied by the government's promise to maintain the
confidentiality of the disclosed information, while withholding that same
information from the plaintiffs in the civil case. Courts have largely
rejected this approach to selective waiver. 198 A disclosure of confidential
information to one outsider generally waives the privilege and work
product immunity as to all outsiders, as explained in In re
Columbia/HCA HealthcareCorp. Billing PracticesLitigation.199
In re Columbia/HCA arose out of a Department of Justice ("DoJ")
investigation of Columbia/HCA for possible Medicaid and Medicare
fraud. Either in anticipation of this investigation, or in response to it,
Columbia/HCA conducted internal audits of its Medicare patient records,
focusing on the billing codes assigned to patients in order to receive
Medicare reimbursement."'
Ultimately, Columbia/HCA began
negotiating with the government to settle the fraud investigation. As part
of this effort, Columbia/HCA agreed to produce some of its internal audit
documents to the DoJ.20
In exchange for this cooperation, the DoJ
198. See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293
F.3d 289, 302-07 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that defendant waived its privilege and work
product immunity); Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 684-88 (finding waiver of privilege
and work product immunity); In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir.
1993) (finding waiver of work product immunity where there was no confidentiality
agreement with the SEC); Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1423-31 (finding waiver of
privilege and work product immunity); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 62326 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding waiver of privilege and tangible work product but not opinion
work product); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(finding waiver of attorney-client privilege); In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 229 F.R.D. 636,
645 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (rejecting attorney-client privilege and work product immunity
claims); McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 819-21 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004) (finding waiver of privilege and work product); McKesson Corp. v. Green,
610 S.E.2d 54, 56 (Ga. 2005) (agreeing with lower court that defendant waived work
product immunity). But see Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th
Cir. 1978) (recognizing selective waiver concept); Maruzen Co. v. HSBC USA, Inc., No.
00 CIV. 1079(RO), 00 CIV. 1512(RO), 2002 WL 1628782, at **1-2 (S.D.N.Y. July 23,
2002) (holding that work product immunity not waived where defendants had
confidentiality agreements with government agencies); Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc.,
No. Civ.A. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at **7-11 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2002) (involving
work product and adopting selective waiver rule where disclosures are made to law
enforcement agencies under a confidentiality agreement).
199. 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).
200. Id. at 291-92.
201. Id. at 292.
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agreed to certain confidentiality provisions. The agreement under which
the documents were produced to the DoJ provided that:
[t]he disclosure of any report, document, or information by one party
to the other does not constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege or
claim under the work product doctrine. Both parties reserve the right
to contest the assertion of any privilege by the other party to the
agreement, but will not argue that the disclosing party, by virtue of
waived any
the disclosures it makes pursuant to this agreement,20 has
2
applicable privilege or work product doctrine claim.
The DoJ and Columbia/HCA eventually settled the fraud
investigation, with Columbia/HCA paying an $840 million fine.20 3
When the results of the investigation came to light, a number of
insurance companies and individuals began scrutinizing their bills from
Columbia/HCA. This resulted in numerous lawsuits in which the
20 4
plaintiffs alleged that Columbia/HCA over-billed them for its services.
The plaintiffs naturally sought to obtain copies of the audits that
Columbia/HCA provided to the government.20 5 Columbia/HCA resisted
on attorney-client privilege and work product grounds, but lost those
arguments in the trial court.20 6 The case then made its way to the Sixth
Circuit on an interlocutory appeal by Columbia/HCA.
Columbia/HCA argued that it could selectively waive its attorneyclient privilege and work product immunity; that is, the disclosure of its
internal documents to the government was not a waiver as to the various
private plaintiffs, especially in light of its confidentiality agreement with
the DoJ. 20 7 After conducting an extensive analysis of the selective
waiver doctrine, 20 8 the court addressed the doctrine in the attorney-client
privilege context and, for several reasons rejected "the concept of
selective waiver, in any of its various forms. 20 9
First, the selective waiver doctrine does not foster full and frank
communications between the client and attorney, which is one of the
principal reasons for recognizing the attorney-client privilege. 210 The
approach urged by Columbia/HCA and other selective waiver advocates
merely encourages the voluntary disclosure of otherwise confidential
information to government agencies; the attorney-client privilege was
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. (quoting agreement) (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 293.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 295-302.
Id. at 302.
See id
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never intended to protect a client's communications with the
government. 21' Second, any form of selective waiver transforms the
21 2
attorney-client privilege into just another tactical weapon in litigation.
Third, and with respect to the idea that a confidentiality agreement
legitimizes selective waiver, the attorney-client privilege derives from
the common law. 213 "It is not a creature of contract, arranged between
parties to suit the whim of the moment. 21 4 Although the recognition of
selective waiver where a confidentiality agreement is employed may
protect the expectations of the parties to the agreement, it does not serve
"the 'public ends' of adequate legal' 2 15representation that the attorneyclient privilege is intended to protect.
The court acknowledged that there was considerable appeal to
selective waiver when the initial disclosure is to an arm of the
government. 1 6 By waiving the privilege as to the government, the client
furthers the truth-seeking process and increases the likelihood of
corporate self-policing.21 7 Unfortunately, this argument has no logical
stopping point. Insofar as truth seeking is concerned, private litigants
many times stand in the government's shoes, especially in shareholder
derivative suits and qui tam actions. 218 Furthermore, a countervailing
argument can be made that the government should not hinder the truthThe
seeking process by entering into confidentiality agreements.
government "should act to bring to light illegal activities, not to 2assist
19
wrongdoers in concealing the information from the public domain.,
In the end, a client's decision to negotiate a settlement, and in those
negotiations reveal confidential information, is simply a tactical decision.
That decision, like all other tactical decisions in litigation, has "an upside
and a downside., 220 The downside for the client, quite obviously, is the
certain loss of its privilege across the board. 21
After dealing with the attorney-client privilege, the court turned to
The court noted at the outset that
the work product doctrine.
211.

Id. (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d

1414, 1425 (3d Cir. 1991)).
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. (quoting In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993)).
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 304.

221. See id. ("Just as the attorney-client privilege itself provides certainty to litigants
that information relayed to one's attorney will not be disclosed, rejection of selective
waiver provides further certainty that waiver of the privilege ensures that the information
will be disclosed.") (footnote omitted).
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Columbia/HCA's waiver of the attorney-client privilege did not
necessarily mean that it also had waived work product immunity.222 But,
the court then embarked on analysis of selective waiver cases that did not
bode well for Columbia/HCA.223
In ultimately determining that Columbia/HCA waived work product
immunity, the court noted that in the selective waiver context, the initial
disclosure of confidential information must be made to an adversary.224
That clearly was the situation at hand; there was no doubt that the DoJ
was ColumbiaIHCA's adversary at the time of the disclosures. 225 That
being so, there was no compelling reason to differentiate between
selective waiver
of the privilege and selective waiver of work product
226
immunity:
Many of the reasons for disallowing selective waiver in the attorneyclient privilege context also apply to the work product doctrine. The
ability to prepare one's case in confidence, which is the chief reason
articulated... for the work product protections, has little to do with
talking to the Government. Even more than attorney-client privilege
waiver, waiver of the protections afforded by the work product
doctrine is a tactical litigation decision. Attorney and client both
know the material in question was prepared in anticipation of
litigation; the subsequent decision on whether or not to "show your
hand" is quintessential litigation strategy. Like attorney-client
privilege, there is no reason to transform the work product doctrine
into another "brush
on the attorney's palette," used as a sword rather
227
than a shield.
The court concluded that the standard for selectively waiving work
product immunity should be no more stringent than the standard for
selectively waiving the attorney-client privilege. Once work product
immunity is waived, "waiver is complete and final. 2 28
It is difficult to dispute the In re Columbia/HCA court's reasoning
as to selective waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The voluntary
disclosure of confidential communications to a third-party generally
waives the privilege. 229 An investigating government agency is not
within the magic circle of others with whom the client shares a common

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
United

Id. (quoting and citing cases).
See id. at 305-06.
Id. at 306 n.28.
Id.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 306-07 (citations omitted).
Id. at 307.
In re Keeper of the Records, 348 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2003); Genentech, Inc. v.
States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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interest; the investigating agency is an adversary. 23° Nor can a client
who voluntarily shares confidential information with the government
generally argue that it was compelled to do so, making its disclosure
involuntary. 231 Though it is true that failure to cooperate with the
government may subject the client to potentially harsh criminal or civil
penalties, the client is free to decide that whatever punishment the
government might mete out is not as bad as the potential result in related
civil litigation if confidential information is revealed, and thus assert the
attorney-client or work product immunity against the government.23 2
There is no logical basis to forge a "government investigation
exception" to the selective waiver doctrine, as some urge.233 As the In re
Columbia/HCA court explained, such an exception has no logical
limits. 234
There is nothing to suggest that the recognition of a
government investigation exception is necessary to encourage parties to
voluntarily cooperate with government agencies; indeed, corporations
have long cooperated in government investigations despite the fact that
their associated disclosures are neither privileged nor immune from
discovery in other contexts.2 35 Contrary to the view expressed by the
dissent in In re Columbia/HCA, an exception cannot be justified on the
basis that government investigations are "generally more important" than
civil litigation arising out of the same set of facts.236
Consider a case in which a large corporation engages in accounting
fraud so serious that investors are ruined, or employees lose their
237 Tefc
pensions.
The fact that the government may extract a large fine from
the corporation, or send its officers to prison, may give investors or
employees some sense of satisfaction, but it does nothing to lessen their
financial harm. On the other hand, civil litigation against those who
allegedly perpetrated or aided and abetted the fraud may restore some of
230. See United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 684-85 (1st Cir. 1997).
231. See id. at 686 ("Anyone who chooses to disclose a privileged document to a third
party... has an incentive to do so, whether for gain or to avoid disadvantage.").
232. This argument admittedly holds less force in criminal matters where an
indictment would put a company out of business and to avoid indictment the company
must "cooperate" with the government, such cooperation to include waiving its attorneyclient privilege and work product immunity.
233. See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293
F.3d 289, 308 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, C.J., dissenting) (advocating "a government
investigation exception to the third-party waiver rule").
234. Id. at 303 (quoting Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 686).
235. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414,
1426 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing corporations' cooperation in SEC investigations).
236. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 312 (Boggs, C.J., dissenting).
237. See Howard Witt, Lay Says He Is Much Poorer-And Misunderstood, CHI.
TRIB., July 9, 2004, at 18 (reporting former Enron CEO Ken Lay's acknowledgement that
many former Enron employees and shareholders lost their life savings and retirement
funds in the company's collapse).
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In these
the losses suffered by shareholders or employees.238
circumstances, civil litigation is by any objective measure "more
important" than an associated government inquiry. As for subjective
considerations, such as deterrence, large judgments and settlements in
civil cases deter other potential offenders just as well as regulatory
penalties or criminal fines.
With respect to the work product doctrine, it is generally accepted
that the voluntary disclosure of work product to an adversary waives any
immunity that would otherwise attach to the information revealed.23 9
After all, the need for immunity disappears as soon as work product is
shared with the adversary. 240 Even so, some courts hold that work
product immunity survives voluntary disclosure to the government where
disclosure is made pursuant to a confidentiality agreement, 241 or where
the information disclosed constitutes opinion work product as compared
to tangible work product.242
As a practical matter, clients and attorneys who disclose
confidential information to government agencies in adversarial roles
should expect that their disclosures waive the attorney-client privilege
and work product immunity.24 3 To the extent that they want to try to
protect that information from other outsiders, they should produce it
pursuant to an agreement that obligates the government to maintain the
confidentiality of the information disclosed. That agreement should
238. See, e.g., Morgan Pays $2.2 Billion on Enron, CHI. TRIB., June 15, 2005, § 3, at
3 (reporting that JPMorgan Chase & Co. agreed to pay $2.2 billion to settle a class action
lawsuit over its role in helping Enron Corp. engineer its far-reaching frauds).
239. In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993); Westinghouse,
951 F.2d at 1428 (distinguishing between disclosures to adversaries and third-parties).
240. In re Steinhardt Partners,9 F.3d at 235.
241. See, e.g., In re Natural Gas Commodity Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6186VMAJP, 2005
WL 1457666, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2005); In re McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 99-CV20743, 2005 WL 934331, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005); Maruzen Co. v. HSBC USA,
Inc., No. 00 CIV. 1079(RO), 00 CIV. 1512(RO), 2002 WL 1628782, at **1-2 (S.D.N.Y.
July 23, 2002); Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. Civ.A. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622,
at **7-11 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2002); see also In re Steinhardt Partners,9 F.3d at 236
(suggesting that there might be no waiver of work product immunity where a disclosing
party and the SEC "have entered into an explicit agreement that the SEC will maintain
the confidentiality of the disclosed materials").
242. See, e.g., In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1988).
243. There are cases in which a party communicates with the government in
connection with an investigation into its alleged conduct and the government later seeks
disclosure of materials supporting those communications or additional related
communications. When the party resists, claiming that in cooperating it never intended
to waive the attorney-client privilege or work product immunity, the government asserts
that it impliedly waived all claims of privilege or immunity through its voluntary
communications. Courts reject this approach on fairness grounds. See, e.g., John Doe
Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 299, 302-07 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding no work product
waiver); In re Keeper of the Records, 348 F.3d 16, 26-29 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding no
privilege waiver).
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further provide that the disclosing party is providing the information in
reliance upon the government's promise of confidentiality, and that the
party reserves the right to assert the attorney-client privilege and work
product immunity against third parties. There is a chance that such an
agreement will maintain the privilege and immunity, especially in states
where the issue has not already been decided in favor of disclosure.2 44
The chances of success are slimmer in federal courts, where the clear
weight of authority flatly rejects selective waiver.245
Even here,
however, work product immunity may survive if the information
disclosed to the government is accompanied by a well-drafted
confidentiality agreement.
An interesting selective waiver dilemma arises where work product
is at issue and the attorney does not want it revealed. Assume, for
example, that ABC Corporation is the subject of a government
investigation. The government demands that ABC waive its attorneyclient privilege and work product immunity in connection with the
investigation. ABC decides to do so in an effort to avoid possible
criminal charges.24 6 This concerns ABC's regular outside counsel,
Attorney, who worries that the surrender of his work product may expose
him to criminal charges, or to a civil action for fraud, based on advice he
gave ABC. Can Attorney prevent ABC from giving his work product to
the government?
Because both the lawyer and the client hold work product
immunity, the client may waive it as to itself,247 but the client may not
waive its lawyer's work product immunity.24 8 In many instances,
however, a lawyer's ability to protect her work product will be short
lived. In cases involving allegations of crime or fraud, the government
will be able to use the work product revealed by the client to argue that
244. See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at **7-8 (involving work product immunity).
245. In 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") recommended that
Congress enact legislation to enhance the SEC's ability to obtain significant but
otherwise unobtainable information (i.e., information that is either privileged or immune).
THE AUDITOR'S NEED, supra note 156, at 13. In May 2003, members of Congress
introduced H.R. 2179, which proposes an amendment to the 1934 Securities & Exchange
Act to provide that in certain circumstances a person or entity may provide privileged or
immune materials to the SEC or another appropriate regulatory agency without waiving
attorney-client privilege or work product protections. Id. at 13-14 (quoting H.R. 2179).
Of course, even if H.R. 2179 becomes law, it will not protect against waiver in all
situations or circumstances involving the federal government. See id. at 14 (noting this
fact with respect to communications with outside auditors).
246. See Andrew Longstreth, Double Agent, AM. LAW., Feb. 2005, at 68, 70 (noting
that companies "now readily waive the privilege" in such circumstances).
247. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, Thurs. Special Grand Jury Sept. Term, 1991, 33 F.3d 342, 349 (4th Cir.
1994); In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981).
248. In re GrandJury, 43 F.3d at 972; In re Doe, 662 F.2d at 1079.
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the crime-fraud exception to the work product doctrine vitiates the
attorney's work product immunity.2 49 Once the government makes a
prima facie crime-fraud showing, the lawyer's work product immunity is
gone, and the government will obtain all of the lawyer's documents and
information.25 °
VI.

Common Interest Arrangements

Lawsuits and other adversarial proceedings often involve multiple
defendants. Co-defendants and joint targets of government inquiries may
share common interests in their defense of matters, and thus want to
coordinate their efforts without destroying the privileged status of their
communications with their respective lawyers. Such cooperation is
possible by virtue of the "common interest doctrine," which is an
exception to the general rule that the disclosure of privileged information
to third parties waives the attorney-client privilege. 251 The common
interest doctrine effectively widens the circle of people to whom clients
may disclose confidential communications.25 2
Under the common interest doctrine, the "sharing of privileged
information that otherwise would constitute a waiver does not relinquish
the protections of the privilege, so long as the parties maintain the
confidentiality of the shared information., 253 Although developed in the
context of the attorney-client privilege, the common interest doctrine has
been expanded
to protect against the waiver of work product
25 4
immunity.
Common interest arrangements differ from situations in which a
single lawyer represents two clients with common interests. Where a
single lawyer represents co-clients, communications between the coclients to the lawyer about the matter of mutual interest are not privileged
as between the clients.255 If the clients want to keep their separate
communications with their lawyer confidential from one another, they

249. See In re Doe, 662 F.2d at 1079-81.
250. Inre Grand Jury Proceedings, Thurs. Special, 33 F.3d at 348 (holding that to
overcome opinion work product the government need only make a prima facie crime
fraud showing; there is no requirement that it show something more than is necessary to
obtain the attorney's fact work product).
251. Black v. S.W. Water Conservation Dist., 74 P.3d 462, 469 (Colo. Ct. App.
2003).
252. Boyd v. Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203. 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
253. Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-Front
Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why it is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV.469,

511 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
254. See Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n v. Fields, 75 P.3d 1088, 1100-01 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2003).
255. Brandon v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 681 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Iowa 2004).
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must expressly so agree.256 Under the common interest doctrine, on the
other hand, the parties' common interest does not imply an agreement to
share all relevant information.25 7
A. Joint Defense Agreements in Litigation
The common interest doctrine often surfaces where a plaintiff sues
multiple defendants, who then share a common interest in defeating the
plaintiff s claims. To present a unified front, the defendants, represented
by different lawyers, agree to coordinate their defense by way of a "joint
defense agreement," with their communications protected by a "joint
defense privilege." 258 In fact, the joint defense privilege is not a new or
separate privilege. 259 Rather, it is a common interest arrangement that,
like all other common interest arrangements, assumes the existence of a
valid underlying attorney-client privilege. 260 A joint defense agreement
261
itself does not create a common interest or joint defense privilege.
The joint defense privilege also protects group members' work
product.262 For the joint defense privilege to apply to work product, it
must be shown that the information at issue falls within the ambit of the
qualified immunity afforded by the work product doctrine. Again, the
joint defense privilege protects against waiver, assuming valid
underlying immunity-it does not create a new form of protection.263
To assert the joint defense privilege, a party must establish (1) that
the protected communications were made in the course of a joint
litigation effort, and (2) that they were designed to further that effort.2 64
256. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 75 cmt. d.
257. Id. § 76 cmt. e.
258. Multiple plaintiffs may enter into joint prosecution agreements that spawn the
same privilege and confidentiality issues. See, e.g., Summers v. UAL Corp. ESOP
Comm., No. 03 C 1537, 2004 WL 2583877 (N.D. 111.Nov. 10, 2004); Associated
Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 975 P.2d 231 (Kan. 1999).
259. Gulf Islands Leasing, Inc. v. Bombardier Capital, Inc., 215 F.R.D. 466, 470
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
260. In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 229 F.R.D. 636, 645 (C.D. Cal. 2005); see, e.g.,
Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 250-51 (1st Cir. 2002) (common interest
doctrine afforded no protection from discovery where there was no valid underlying
claim of attorney-client privilege).
261. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n v. Fields, 75 P.3d 1088, 1099 n. 11(Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003); OXY Resources Cal. LLC v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 637-38
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. PMNC, 753
N.Y.S.2d 343, 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (quoting case).
262. Ferko v. Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 396, 401 (E.D.
Tex. 2003); Lugosch v. Congel, 219 F.R.D. 220, 240 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
263. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 142 F.R.D. 471, 478
(D. Colo. 1992).
264. Grand Jury Proceedings v. United States, 156 F.3d 1038, 1042-43 (10th Cir.
1998).
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Of course, the communications to be protected must have been made in
confidence 265 and must further the parties' joint defense.
If
communications are not intended to further the parties' joint defense, but
instead relate to claims that the parties may have against one another,
they are discoverable.2 66
A joint defense group member who wants to keep information it
shares with its attorney from being disclosed to other members of the
group must request such confidentiality from counsel. Otherwise, it is
assumed that any information exchanged as part of the joint defense
effort can be freely disclosed to other members of the defense group and
their counsel.2 67
1.

Cases and Controversies

Most joint defense problems involve client confidences. Typically,
counsel for one member of a joint defense group formerly represented
the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges that its former attorneys possess its
confidential information, that the attorneys have shared that information
with the other members of the joint defense group, or should be
presumed to have done so, and that all defense counsel must be
disqualified as a result. This implicates Model Rule 1.9(a), which as
amended in 2002 provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially
related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse
to the interests of the former client unless
the former client gives
26
informed consent, confirmed in writing. 8
The prior version of the rule was nearly identical, except that the former
client was only required to consent "after consultation;" the principle that
such consent had to be informed was implied rather than express, and
269
there was no requirement that the consent be confirmed in writing.
One of the primary purposes of Rule 1.9 is to protect former clients'
confidences. 270 Because it would be very difficult for the former client to
demonstrate that the attorney revealed its confidences to its detriment,
265. Boyd v. Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203, 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
266. See, e.g., Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. PMNC, 753
N.Y.S.2d 343, 345-46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
267. Ageloffv. Noranda, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 72, 76-77 (D.R.I. 1996).
268. MODEL RULES, supra note 97, at R. 1.9(a).
269.

A.B.A., THE 2002 CHANGES TO THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 37-

40 (2003) (showing the 2002 amendments to Model Rule 1.9) [hereinafter THE 2002
CHANGES].

270. Douglas R. Richmond, The Rude Question of Standing in Attorney
DisqualificationDisputes, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 17, 26 (2001).
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most courts presume a breach of confidence once the potential for the
disclosure of confidential information is shown.2 7' Some courts go
further and impute the disclosure of the former client's confidences to
other lawyers in the subject lawyer's firm, thus disqualifying the entire
firm.22 National Medical Enterprises,Inc. v. Godbey273 is an illustrative
case.
National Medical Enterprises ("NME") retained Ed Tomko of the
law firm of Baker & Botts to represent two of its former executives,
Cronen and Wicoff, in connection with a number of criminal
investigations and civil suits arising out of NME's operation of
psychiatric hospitals. While representing Cronen and Wicoff, Tomko
obtained confidential information from them and from NME, as well as
in conferences and meetings at which a joint defense was discussed.2 74
Tomko's communications with NME, its employees and former
employees, and their counsel, was subject to a joint defense agreement.
That agreement provided in pertinent part:
1. Unless expressly stated in writing to the contrary, any
communications between or among any of the client members and/or
the attorney members... are confidential and are protected from
disclosure to any third party by the joint defense privilege, the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.
3. None of the information obtained by any client member or any
attorney member pursuant to this agreement shall be disclosed to any
third party without the consent of the attorney member who disclosed
the information in the first instance.
6. Each client member understands and acknowledges... that he or
she is represented by his or her own attorney in this matter; that while
the attorneys representing the other members have a duty to preserve
the confidences disclosed to them pursuant to this agreement, they
will not be acting as his or her attorney in this matter; and that the
attorney representing the other client members will owe a duty of
271. See, e.g., Bergeron v. Mackler, 623 A.2d 489, 494 (Conn. 1993); Chrispens v.
Coastal Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 897 P.2d 104, 114 (Kan. 1995); Sullivan County Reg'l
Refuse Disposal Dist. v. Town of Acworth, 686 A.2d 755, 758 (N.H. 1996); Cont'l
Resources, Inc. v. Schmalenberger, 656 N.W.2d 730, 736-37 (N.D. 2003); State v.
Crepeault, 704 A.2d 778, 783 (Vt. 1997); State ex rel. Ogden Newspapers, Inc. v. Wilkes,
566 S.E.2d 560, 563 (W. Va. 2002).
272. See, e.g., Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 954 (Cal. 1994); In re
Guardianship of Mowrer, 979 P.2d 156, 159 (Mont. 1999); Bechtold v. Gomez, 576
N.W.2d 185, 190 (Neb. 1998); Nat'l Med. Enters., Inc. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 131
(Tex. 1996).
273. 924 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. 1996).
274. Id. at 125.
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loyalty to their own respective clients only. Each client member
further understands and acknowledges that the attorney members
representing other client members have the right, and may have the
275
obligation, to take actions against his or her own interest ....

Tomko and Baker & Botts ultimately withdrew from representing
276
Cronen and Wicoff for reasons unrelated to the looming dispute.
Some seventeen months later, Baker & Botts sued NME on behalf of a
number of former NME patients. The allegations in this suit tracked
those in the matters in which Tomko had represented Cronen and Wicoff,
although the Baker & Botts lawyers suing NME had not been involved in
Cronen's and Wicoff s defense.27 7

NME moved to disqualify Baker & Botts on the grounds that
Tomko obtained confidential information from NME and that all Baker
& Botts lawyers presumptively had access to that information. 78 Cronen
filed his own motion to disqualify Baker & Botts, although he was not a
defendant in the new suit. The trial court denied both motions. 279 NME
and Cronen
filed a petition for mandamus with the Texas Supreme
280
Court.
The National Medical Enterprises court began by observing that
Baker & Botts' disqualification turned on whether Tomko should be
disqualified under the circumstances. 81
Although Tomko never
represented NME in the Cronen and Wicoff matters, the lack of an
attorney-client relationship did not mean that he owed NME no duties.
Tomko, like all parties to the joint defense agreement, had a duty to
preserve shared confidences.2 82 Even though he never represented NME,
"he was admitted into its confidences with his pledge to preserve
them. ' '283 Even if there were a way for him to honor his joint defense
obligations while prosecuting claims against NME, such conduct would
create a strong appearance of impropriety. 84
Given that Tomko could not represent the plaintiffs, the question
then became whether the other Baker & Botts attorneys should be
disqualified. 285 There was no evidence that Tomko had disclosed NME's
confidences to the Baker & Botts lawyers representing the plaintiffs.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 126-27.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 128-29.
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 131.
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Indeed, Tomko had gone to great lengths to screen the information from
disclosure.28 6
Under Texas law, there is an irrebuttable presumption that an
attorney in a law firm has access to the confidences of the clients and
former clients of all other attorneys in the firm.287 The NationalMedical
Enterprises court saw no reason why the presumption should not apply
to the situation at hand, stating:
The attorney's duty to preserve confidences shared under a joint
defense agreement is no less because the person to whom they belong
was never a client. The attorney's promise places him in the role of a
fiduciary, the same as toward a client.... The difficulty in proving a
misuse of confidences, and the anxiety that a misuse may occur, is no
less for the non-client. The doubt cast upon the legal profession is
the same in either situation. Because the reasons for the presumption
apply equally in both situations, and there are no other bases for
differentiating between them, we hold that an attorney's knowledge
of a non-client's confidential information that he has promised
to
28 8
preserve is imputed to other attorneys in the same law firm.
The court next turned to Cronen's motion to disqualify Baker &
Botts.
The only question there was whether Baker & Botts'
representation of the plaintiffs was adverse to Cronen.289 The court
concluded that it was, and thus disqualified Baker & Botts.
Perhaps the leading disqualification case arising out of a joint
defense agreement is Essex Chemical Corp. v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co.,290 which stemmed from a 1988 takeover attempt of Essex
Chemical Corp. and Essex Specialty Products. Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom represented Essex in all takeover and acquisition
negotiations, and in subsequent litigation. Skadden had access to
numerous Essex documents relating to all aspects of its business, and it
worked closely with Essex personnel and advisors, including the
company's in-house counsel and investment banker.29'
Several years later, Essex sued several insurance companies in a
declaratory judgment action. One of Essex's insurers, Home, retained
Skadden to represent it in that action. In 1996, the various defendants in
the coverage litigation, including Skadden, entered into a joint defense
agreement. Thereafter, Essex moved to disqualify Skadden, and it
further sought to disqualify the remaining five defense firms based on
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 133.
993 F. Supp. 241 (D.N.J. 1998).
Id. at 243-44.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
292

[Vol. 110:2

their execution of the joint defense agreement.
The magistrate on the case granted Essex's motion to disqualify all
defense counsel, ruling that Skadden's disqualification was mandated by
New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(a)(1). The other defense
counsel had to be disqualified because their participation in the joint
defense group created a risk that the confidential information that
Skadden acquired from Essex could be used to the company's detriment
in the current action.29 3 The magistrate further concluded, without
looking at the joint defense agreement, that the defendants' execution of
the agreement gave rise to an implied attorney-client relationship
between Essex and all defense counsel.294 This eliminated Essex's need
to show that the other defense firms actually received confidential
information from Skadden. The magistrate also found that the joint
defense privilege prevented defense counsel from rebutting the
presumption of shared confidences. 295 Finally, the magistrate found that
the joint defense agreement created an appearance of impropriety that
compelled the disqualification of all defense counsel.2 96
The defendants appealed to the district court, which first found that
the magistrate's application of an irrebuttable presumption of shared
confidences between Skadden and the other defense counsel was
improper. 299 This required a double imputation of knowledge: first from
the Skadden attorneys involved in the 1988 litigation to all Skadden
attorneys, and then from Skadden to all defense counsel.298 Double
imputation requires painstaking factual analysis, which the magistrate
did not employ. Defense counsel had to be given the opportunity to
establish (1) that they acquired no confidential information from
Skadden, and (2) the precise nature of the relationship among all defense
counsel. An examination of the joint defense agreement, which defined
the group members' relationship and obligations, was essential.29 9
The court next found that the magistrate erred in finding that the
joint defense agreement gave rise to an implied attorney-client
relationship between Essex and all members of the joint defense group,
stating that the magistrate's30 0 determination was "contrary to law and
unsupported by the record.,
With respect to the alleged appearance of impropriety
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id. at 244.
Id.
Id. at 245.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 251.
Id.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 253.
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accompanying Skadden's participation in the joint defense group, the
Essex Chemical court noted that whether an appearance of impropriety
exists must be determined from the viewpoint of informed and concerned
citizens.3 °1 This requires a careful analysis of all relevant facts and
circumstances as seen through the eyes of a reasonable person, as well as
an analysis of whether any legitimate purpose would be served by
disqualification. 302 Given the extreme nature of disqualification, the
appearance of impropriety must have a reasonable basis in fact.30 3 The
magistrate's appearance of impropriety analysis lacked any factual
foundation.30 4 Therefore, the disqualification order had to be reversed on
this basis as well.
Finally, the court balanced the hardship that the magistrate's order
caused. Even if there was an actual conflict of interest the defendants
argued that the hardship to them substantially outweighed any hardship
to Essex. 30 5 They further argued that the disqualification of all defense
counsel would have a chilling effect on the formation of joint defense
groups without serving any legitimate purpose.30 6 Essex, in turn, argued
that the threat to the legal profession posed by defense counsel's
continued representation far outweighed any hardship to the
defendants.30 7 The Magistrate did not address the relative hardships
posed by defense counsel's disqualification. 30 8 The Essex Chemical
court thus reversed the disqualification order on this basis. 30 9 After
reversing the disqualification order, the court remanded the matter to the
Magistrate. The court directed the Magistrate to conduct a hearing to
ascertain the material facts surrounding Skadden's participation in the
joint defense group and to determine whether, or to what extent, Skadden
shared Essex's confidential information with other defendants.3 10
2.

Drafting Joint Defense Agreements

Although joint defense agreements need not be written,31 1 the lack

301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 254.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 255.
310. Id.
311. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 76(1) (imposing no writing requirement
in common interest arrangements); see also In re Skiles, 102 S.W.3d 323, 326 (Tex. App.
2003) (observing that Texas statutory joint defense privilege does not require a written
agreement).
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of a written agreement can lead to potentially disastrous confusion. 312 In
United States v. Weissman,313 for example, the defendant could not meet
his burden to demonstrate that a joint defense agreement existed where
there was no written agreement and the attorneys involved could not
agree on whether an agreement had been reached at a key meeting.3 14
The defendant's revelations at that meeting were thus held admissible in
his criminal trial, leading to his conviction. 3 As the Weissman court
observed, "[s]ome form of joint strategy is necessary to establish a 316
[joint
defense agreement], rather than merely the impression of one side.,
All joint defense agreements should be written and should include
certain essential provisions. First, the agreement should specify that all
defense counsel have completed conflict of interest checks and know of
no conflicts with the plaintiff. Second, the agreement should state that
each law firm represents only its client and that each party will look only
to its attorneys for advice. This is important because the existence of an
attorney-client relationship is a question of fact, 317 and all defense group
members should want to prevent an attomey-client relationship from
being implied between them.318 This is also important because the
existence of an attorney-client relationship sometimes turns on the
subjective belief of the prospective client, 319 and it is unreasonable for a
group member to believe that it shares an attorney-client relationship
with another party's counsel in the face of an express provision to the
contrary. Third, the agreement should not provide for the engagement or
payment of common counsel, and the joint defense group should not
engage common counsel, because the use of common counsel risks
creating an attorney-client relationship where one would not otherwise
exist. 320 Fourth, the agreement should provide (1) that confidential
312. See, e.g., Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, No. 03 Civ.5460 SAS, 2004 WL
2712200, at **5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2004) (finding waiver where one party denied
existence ofjoint defense strategy).
313. 195 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1999).
314. Id. at 99-100.
315. See id.
at 98-100.
316. Id.at 100.
317. Stender v. Vincent, 992 P.2d 50, 58 (Haw. 2000); Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v.
Mangan, 763 A.2d 1189, 1192-93 (Me. 2001); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Shaw,
732 A.2d 876, 883 (Md. 1999); Gramling v. Mem'l Blood Ctrs. of Minn., 601 N.W.2d
457, 459 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Inre Disciplinary Action Against Giese, 662 N.W.2d
250, 255 (N.D. 2003); DiLuglio v. Providence Auto Body, Inc., 755 A.2d 757, 766 (R.I.

2000).
318. See United States v. Henke, 222 F.3d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that "[a]
joint defense agreement establishes an implied attorney-client relationship with the codefendant").
319. State v. Fodor, 880 P.2d 662, 668 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Inre Jackson, 842 So.
2d 359, 362 (La. 2003); Inre Disciplinary Action Against Giese, 662 N.W.2d at 255.
320. See, e.g.,
City of Kalamazoo v. Mich. Disposal Serv. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 219,
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information will not be revealed to third-parties or used outside the case
absent the consent of all group members, (2) that information sharing
between group members does not waive privilege or work product
protections with respect to third-parties, and (3) that a waiver by one
defense group member will not bind other group members. Fifth, the
agreement must state that the defendants have a common interest in the
defense of the lawsuit, with the agreement being intended to further that
interest. Sixth, the agreement should state that the parties agree to share
confidential information only in the subject case, and only pursuant to
the agreement's terms. Seventh, the agreement should provide for group
members' withdrawals, settlements, or dismissals from the case. Finally,
the parties themselves should sign the agreement.
B.

Common Interest Arrangements in Business Transactions Where
Litigation is Anticipated

Parties may enter into business transactions that affect the interests
or rights of others. Sometimes these transactions require the parties to
share information that they do not want to share with competitors or
interested parties who may later challenge their deal in adversary
proceedings. The issue is whether parties to a transaction can enter into a
common interest arrangement, long before they are actually sued by a
third party, that allows them to exchange privileged information without
fear of waiver. This was the issue in a California case, OXY Resources
CaliforniaLLC v. Superior Court.32 '
In OXY Resources, OXY Resources California LLC and EOG
Resources, Inc., entered into a complex transaction in which they
exchanged interests in a number of oil and gas producing properties,
including property subject to a preferential purchase right held by
Calpine Natural Gas LP. 322 Roughly six weeks before finalizing their
transaction, EOG and OXY entered into a joint defense agreement.3 23
The agreement recited that the parties intended to exchange certain
assets; that they anticipated that the past and future ownership and
operation of those assets would present various factual and legal issues
common to them; that as "anticipated potential defendants" they would
share a common interest in defending claims by thirdparties; that they
might wish to make joint efforts in preparing any defense to anticipated
actions or proceedings; that the documents and information exchanged in
the transaction, and associated communications, were privileged,
231-38
321.
322.
323.

(W.D. Mich. 2000).
9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 626-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 627.
Id. at 628.
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immune, and otherwise exempt from discovery; and that no sharing of
information between them would be deemed to waive any otherwise
applicable privilege or exemption from disclosure.324
EOG and OXY publicly announced their transaction several days
after it was completed. Calpine later sued them on a variety of theories,
all related to the alleged deprivation of its preferential purchase right.325
During discovery, Calpine sought the production of 202 documents
from EOG and OXY; 30 of the documents were pre-acquisition
communications, while the remaining documents were prepared after
EOG and OXY completed their deal. EOG and OXY sought to shield all
326
of the documents from discovery under their joint defense agreement.
Moving to compel production of the documents, Calpine argued that
there is no joint defense privilege in California, that EOG and OXY
could not retroactively invoke their joint defendant status to shield
communications made long before the action was filed, and that they
waived any privilege by disclosing communications "to an adverse party
on the opposite side of a business transaction."32 7 The trial court granted
Calpine's motion to compel discovery as to the post-acquisition
documents, but denied it with respect to the pre-acquisition
documents.328
Both OXY and Calpine petitioned for writs of
mandamus.3 29
At the outset, the OXY Resources court noted that it was not free to
create a new privilege; it could apply only those privileges created by
California statutes. 330 Rejecting OXY's characterization of its claimed
"joint defense privilege" or "common interest privilege" as an extension
of the attorney-client privilege,33 1 the OXY Resources court determined
that "the common interest doctrine is more appropriately characterized
under California law as a non-waiver doctrine, analyzed under standard
waiver principles applicable to the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine. 3 32 The court thus examined the litigants' specific
claims in light of these standard waiver principles, which it described this
way:
Applying... waiver principles in the context of communications
among parties with common interests, it is essential that participants
324.
325.
326.
327.

Id. at 628-29.
Id. at 629.
See id. at 630.
Id.

328.

Id. at 631.

329.
330.
331.
332.

Id. at 632.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 635.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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in an exchange have a reasonable expectation that information
disclosed will remain confidential. If a disclosing party does not
have a reasonable expectation that a third party will preserve the
confidentiality of the information, then any applicable privileges are
waived. An expectation of confidentiality, however, is not enough to
avoid waiver. In addition, disclosure of the information must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for
which the lawyer was consulted. Thus, "[f]or the common interest
doctrine to attach, most courts seem to insist that the two parties have
in common an interest in securing legal advice related to the same
their
matter-and that the communications be made to advance 333
shared interest in securing legal advice on that common matter."

Calpine colorfully alleged that EOG's and OXY's joint defense
agreement was void as against public policy because it was "a
shield conspiratorial
and intentional plan to
premeditated
communications involving a transaction that directly and adversely
affected [its] contractual rights., 334 Though recognizing that there is a
potential for abuse when parties rely on common interest arrangements to
protect pre-lawsuit communications, the OXY Resources court explained
that this concern did not render the agreement void, because the
agreement could not shield non-privileged communications from
disclosure.335 Again, the common interest doctrine requires a valid
underlying claim of privilege.336 Thus, the court held that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Calpine's motion to compel the
production of thirteen documents withheld from it solely on the basis of
the joint defense agreement.3 37
Turning next to the common interest doctrine generally, the court
noted that the non-waiver principles expressed in the California Evidence
Code were not limited in application to communications disclosed to
others during litigation. 338 For example, section 912 of the California
"A disclosure in confidence of a
Evidence Code provides:
communication that is protected by [the attorney-client privilege]...
when disclosure is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose for which the lawyer... was consulted, is not a waiver of the
privilege. 3 39 Furthermore, "[t]he need to [share] privileged information
may arise in the negotiation of ...commercial transaction[s]. ' '340 By
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id. at 636-37 (citations omitted).
Id. at 638 (quoting Calpine's brief).
Id.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 638-39.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 635-36 (citations and footnote omitted).
Id. at 642.
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refusing to find a waiver where parties share privileged information in
commercial transactions, courts can create an environment in which
businesses deal more openly with one another, promoting commerce
generally.34 1
Having determined that the common interest doctrine protects
privileged communications where litigation is not imminent, the OXY
Resources court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Calpine's motion to compel the production of the pre-acquisition
documents and in granting that motion as to post-acquisition documents.
In short, the trial court's
findings in both respects rested on an inadequate
3 42
evidentiary foundation.

OXY Resources is a very practical decision. Businesses often need
to share otherwise privileged or confidential information in order to
make reasonable acquisition, merger, and sale decisions; they should not
have to enter into transactions with the fear that sharing such information
with their deal partners will expose them. Furthermore, "[t]he common
' 343
interest doctrine does not require existing or impending litigation."
Before seizing upon the OXY Resources holding to enter into similar
arrangements, however, lawyers should keep at least two things in mind.
First, OXY Resources turned on the language of key sections of the
California Evidence Code. The attorney-client privilege has been widely
codified, and other states may have very different statutes or evidence
rules.
Second, in OXY Resources, OXY and EOG could be virtually
certain of litigation with Calpine by virtue of Calpine's contractual right
of first refusal in the disputed property.3 44 What if the likelihood of
litigation is not so clear? In some jurisdictions the abstract possibility of
litigation may not implicate the common interest doctrine. Even those
courts that recognize common interest arrangements prepared for
potential litigation require "a palpable threat of litigation at the time of
the communication, rather than a mere awareness that... questionable
conduct may some day result in litigation ... .
For attorneys drafting documents memorializing common interest
arrangements in connection with transactions, many of the principles that
apply to preparing joint defense agreements once litigation is underway
apply. The chance of future litigation should be phrased as a strong
341. See id. (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308,
311 (N.D. Cal. 1987)).
342. Id. at 642-44.
343. Black v. S.W. Water Conservation Dist., 74 P.3d 462, 469 (Colo. Ct. App.
2003).
344. See OXYResources, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 627.
345. In re Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 711 (5th Cir. 2001).
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possibility. If likely litigants can be identified at the time the agreement
is drafted, they should be identified, and the reasons for their expected
adversity should be described.
VII. Recent Developments in Inadvertent Waiver
All experienced lawyers can recall cases in which a party
inadvertently revealed confidential information to an adversary or a third
party. For revealing parties and their lawyers, such disclosures can pose
serious problems. Of course, the lawyers who receive the inadvertently
disclosed materials have their own problem-what are they to do with
the materials that have come into their hands?
There is no consensus among jurisdictions as to whether the
inadvertent disclosure of privileged materials waives any protection that
would otherwise attach.34 6
Courts confronted with inadvertent
disclosures typically take one of three approaches to determining
whether the disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege or work
product immunity. 347 These approaches apply to any type of inadvertent
disclosure.34 8
Under the "lenient approach," the privilege must be knowingly
349
waived, and the determination of inadvertence ends the analysis.
Under the "strict approach," any document produced, whether
inadvertently or otherwise, loses its privileged status upon production.
Finally, there is the "middle," "moderate," or "modern" approach, which
requires courts to make waiver determinations on a case-by-case basis. 351
Courts applying this approach consider (1) the reasonableness of the
precautions taken to avoid inadvertent disclosure; (2) the time taken to
rectify the error; (3) the scope of the discovery; (4) the extent of the
disclosure; and (5) whether the overriding interests of fairness and justice
are served by absolving the party of its error. 352 The first factor typically

346. Save Sunset Beach Coal. v. City of Honolulu, 78 P.3d 1, 21 (Haw. 2003).
347. See Elkton Care Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Quality Care Mgmt., Inc., 805 A.2d
1177, 1183 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (asserting that in inadvertent waiver cases, any
distinction between attorney-client privilege and work product immunity disappears)
(quoting Hartford Fire Ins. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 328 (N.D. Cal. 1985)).
348. See, e.g., United States v. Rigas, 281 F. Supp. 2d 733 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying
the "middle" or "moderate" approach to inadvertent disclosure of information on
computer hard drives).
349. Harp v. King, 835 A.2d 953, 966 (Conn. 2003) (quoting Gray v. Bicknell, 86
F.3d 1472, 1483-84 (8th Cir. 1996)).
350. See id. (quoting Gray and referring to this approach as the "strict test").
351. Save Sunset Beach Coal., 78 P.3d at 22-23; Elkton Care Ctr., 805 A.2d at 1184.
352. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (involving documents produced by defendant in lieu of answering an
interrogatory).
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is the most critical,353 although all of the factors are important and must
be considered.354 This approach reflects the majority rule.355
A.

Recent Cases and Controversies

Not all inadvertent disclosures of confidential information involve
356
documents. Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Marvell Semiconductor, Inc.,
illustrates the danger of carelessness when using the telephone.
In that case, Marvell was negotiating with Jasmine to purchase a
portion of Jasmine's semiconductor business and to employ a group of
Jasmine's engineers. Three Marvell executives, including its general
counsel and an in-house patent attorney, used a speakerphone to call a
senior Jasmine executive.357 The executive was out, and they got her
voicemail. After leaving a message, they continued to talk among
themselves, not realizing that they failed to hang up their
speakerphone. 358 Their conversation revealed that Marvell's real
intention was not to purchase anything, but rather to steal Jasmine's
technology and to pirate away Jasmine personnel using purloined
information about their compensation and stock options. 359 The Jasmine
executive checked her voicemail and heard the entire conversation. The
conversation caused Jasmine to further investigate the intended
3 60
transaction, upon which it discovered more misconduct by Marvell.
Jasmine then sued Marvell for trade secret misappropriation. 6
Marvell moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin
Jasmine from using the recorded conversation. Marvell argued that
because the conversation involved its attorneys, its contents were
protected by the attorney-client privilege. 362 Jasmine argued that Marvell
had waived its privilege by disclosing the information in the voicemail
message, and that the conversation fell within the crime-fraud exception
to the privilege.36 3 The trial court granted Marvell's motion for a
preliminary injunction, concluding that the contents of the conversation
were privileged, and furthermore, that Marvell had not waived the
353. See id. (focusing on this factor).
354. See Harp, 835 A.2d at 969-70 (applying and discussing all five factors); Elkton
Care Ctr., 805 A.2d at 1185 (same).
355. Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1993).
356. 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), review granted, 94 P.3d 475 (Cal.
2004).

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at

125.
125-26.
126.
124.
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it did not intend to disclose the contents of the
privilege because
364
conversation.
The appellate court determined that the trial court erred when it
found that Marvell had not waived the privilege. Under California law,
an "intent to disclose is not required in order for the holder to waive the
privilege through uncoerced disclosure., 365 Although it is true in
California "that an attorney's inadvertent disclosure does not waive the
privilege absent the privilege holder's intent to waive, '36 6 here a nonlawyer executive participated in the call and Marvell's general counsel
Accordingly,
additionally had purely business responsibilities. 367
California's inadvertent waiver rules, which might have saved Marvell
had only its lawyers been involved, did not apply.368 Additionally, the
crime-fraud exception stripped the conversation of its privilege in any
event.369
The California Supreme Court has granted review in Jasmine,
depriving the case of precedential force. 370 Even so, Jasmine is valuable
because it demonstrates that technology is not always a lawyer's friend.
Speakerphones may transmit background conversations that participants
do not intend to share with others outside their office. "Mute" buttons on
The camera and microphone on
telephones may not work.
videoconference equipment may be working when the lawyers in the
room think they are off. There is ample opportunity for error in
electronic communication, and equal need for caution.
Although inadvertent waiver would appear to be of greatest concern
to the party alleged to have waived its privilege, lawyers receiving
privileged materials as a result of adversaries' inadvertence must mind
their own ethical obligations. In Formal Opinion 92-368, the American
Bar Association's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility opined that a lawyer:
[W]ho receives materials that on their face appear to be subject to the
attorney-client privilege or otherwise confidential, under
circumstances where it is clear that they were not intended for the
receiving lawyer, should refrain from examining the materials, notify
lawyer and abide the instructions of the lawyer who sent
the sending
37 1
them.

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 128.
Id.
Id. at 128-29.
See id. at 128.
Id. at 132.
Jasmine Networks v. Marvell Semiconductor, 94 P.3d 475 (Cal. 2004).
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368, at 1 (1992).
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In Holland v. Gordy Co.,37 2 a Michigan court went so far as to state that
the position expressed in Formal Opinion 92-368 binds ABA
members. 373 The court in Resolution Trust Corp. v. First of America
Bank374 reached the same conclusion nearly a decade earlier, while also
suggesting the converse-that lawyers who are not ABA members are
not bound by the opinion.375
The suggestion that ABA ethics opinions bind ABA members is
nonsense. Lawyers are bound by the ethics rules of the states in which
they practice, as well as by rules of conduct adopted by courts and
regulatory authorities before which they appear. If lawyers are bound by
the positions expressed in ABA ethics opinions, are they also bound to
accept or adopt all other positions taken by the ABA?
More
fundamentally, it makes no sense to have one set of ethical duties for
ABA members and another set for lawyers who do not belong to the
ABA, especially since ABA membership is not mandatory.
The ABA retreated from Formal Opinion 92-368 when it created
Rule 4.4(b) in 2002.376 Model Rule 4.4(b) provides: "A lawyer who
receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer's client
and knows or reasonably should know that the document was
inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender. 3 77 Whether a lawyer
who receives a misdirected document is required to take additional steps,
such as returning the document to the sender, is beyond the scope of the
Model Rules. 378 If the law in a particular jurisdiction does not require a
lawyer to return a document inadvertently sent to her, "the decision to
voluntarily return such a document79is a matter of professional judgment
3
ordinarily reserved to the lawyer.
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York's Committee
on Professional and Judicial Ethics (the "New York Committee")
analyzed a lawyer's obligations upon receiving a communication
containing confidences or secrets that is not intended for him in an April
2004 opinion. 380 The New York Committee determined that:

372.

Nos. 231183, 231184, 231185, 2003 WL 1985800 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 29,

2003).
373. Id. at *10 n.20.
374. 868 F. Supp. 217 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
375. Id. at 221 ("The ABA's interpretations [in Formal Op. 92-368] are binding only
on ABA members.") (emphasis added).
376. See THE 2002 CHANGES, supra note 269, at 83-84 (showing addition of
paragraph (b) and new comments to Model Rule 4.4).
377. MODEL RULES, supra note 97, at R. 4.4(b).
378. Id. cmt. 2.
379. Id. cmt. 3.
380. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on Prof'l & Judicial Ethics, Formal
Op. No. 2003-04 (Apr. 9, 2004).
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[A] lawyer receiving a misdirected communication containing
confidences or secrets (1) has obligations to promptly notify the
sending attorney, to refrain from review of the communication, and to
return or destroy the communication if so requested, but, (2) in
limited circumstances, may submit the communication for in camera
review by a tribunal, and (3) is not ethically barred from using
information gleaned prior to knowing or having reason to know that
the communication contains confidences or secrets not intended for
the receiving lawyer. However, it is essential as an ethical matter that
the receiving attorney promptly notify the sending attorney of the
disclosure in order to give the sending attorney a reasonable
opportunit%1 to promptly take whatever steps he or she feels are
necessary.
The New York Committee concluded that a lawyer who receives a
misdirected communication may retain the communication for the sole
purpose of submitting it to a tribunal for in camera review if:
[T]he lawyer (1) promptly notifies the sending lawyer about the
mistaken transmission, and, if requested, provides a copy to the
sending lawyer, (2) believes in good faith, and in good faith
anticipates arguing to the tribunal, that the inadvertent disclosure has
waived the attorney-client or other applicable privilege or that the
communication may not appropriately be withheld from production
for any other reason, and (3) reasonably believes disclosing the
communication to the tribunal is relevant to the 382
argument that
privilege has been waived or otherwise does not apply.
This limited permitted use does not apply, however, if the sender
notifies the receiving attorney of the inadvertent disclosure and demands
383
the documents' return before the receiving attorney actually gets them.
In that case there has effectively been no disclosure.384
A harder question arises where the receiving attorney reviews a
communication before realizing that he is not the intended recipient.
Suppose, for example, an attorney receives a one page facsimile
transmission containing the other side's confidential information. It is
not reasonable to expect that lawyer to purge the information from his
mind, or to be able to litigate or negotiate further as though he has never
seen it. 385 To disqualify, sanction, or professionally discipline the
receiving lawyer in that situation would be unfair to the lawyer and to the

381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

Id. at*1.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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client.3 s6
B.

An Odd Twist: Voluntary but Mistaken Disclosureof Privileged
Documents

It is generally accepted that the attorney-client privilege belongs to,
or is held by, the client. It is also generally accepted that a lawyer may
voluntarily waive the privilege for the client.387 But, it is not always the
case that an apparently voluntary waiver by a lawyer binds the client, as
illustrated by a recent Wisconsin case, HaroldSampson Children's Trust
v. Linda Gale Sampson 1979 Trust. 388
In Harold Sampson, one of the plaintiffs, Beth Bauer, prepared a
number of documents related to her views on litigation strategy and
associated issues for her attorney's use. The plaintiffs' attorney at the
time, Robert Elliott, believed that the documents were not privileged and
389
turned them over to defense counsel in response to a discovery request.
Elliott was replaced as counsel several months later for unrelated
reasons, and the plaintiffs' new counsel soon determined that privileged
documents had been produced. The plaintiffs' new lawyers requested
that the defendants' lawyers return the documents, but defense counsel
refused.39 °
It was undisputed that the documents were privileged, that the
plaintiffs had authorized Elliott to disclose all non-privileged documents
during discovery, and that the documents were produced without the
plaintiffs' knowledge or consent. 39 1 The question was whether:
[A] lawyer's voluntary production of documents in response to
opposing counsel's discovery request constitutes a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege under [a Wisconsin statute] when the lawyer
does not recognize that the documents are subject to the attorneyclient privilege and the documents
are produced without the consent
392
or knowledge of the client.
The trial court answered this question "no," but the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals answered it "yes" and the case then made its way to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.393
386. See id. ("To put the attorney at ethical risk for using information that cannot be
suppressed from knowledge potentially would penalize the innocent receiving attorney
and their [sic] client for the error of another.").
387. EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 270-71.
388. 679 N.W.2d 794 (Wis. 2004).
389. Id. at 796.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 795 (footnote omitted).
393. Id.
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The Wisconsin statute on which the dispute turned provides, in
pertinent part:
A person upon whom this chapter confers a privilege against
disclosure of the confidential matter or communication waives the
privilege if the person or his or her predecessor, while holder of the
privilege, voluntarily discloses or consents to
disclosure of any
394
significant part of the matter or communication.
Another Wisconsin statute provides that the attorney-client privilege
belongs to the client, and that the client may refuse to disclose, and
prevent another person from disclosing, confidential communications.39 5
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in holding that only a client can waive
the attorney-client privilege, concluded that 396
Elliott did not waive his
clients' privilege by producing the documents.
The court of appeals had reasoned that because the clients delegated
discovery to Elliott, and because an attorney is a client's agent, Elliott's
voluntary production of the documents waived the attorney-client
privilege.397 The supreme court rejected this approach.39 8 In an earlier
case in which the supreme court had applied agency theory to impute an
attorney's conduct to his client, equity supported penalizing the client for
the attorney's misconduct; more particularly, penalizing the client in that
case would motivate clients to police disruptive attorneys, thus
improving the justice system.399 In Harold Sampson, the clients were
already motivated to prevent the release of their privileged documents,
and protecting the attorney-client privilege promotes the functioning of
the justice system.40 0
The defendants countered that recognizing a waiver would promote
quality legal representation and would foster the proper functioning of
the judicial system by holding counsel to a reasonable standard of care in
handling privileged information. 40 1 The court disagreed, reasoning that it
would be placing too great a burden on the attorney-client relationship if
it were to recognize a waiver on the facts at hand.4 °2 As the court
explained:
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to promote "full and
frank communication" between client and attorney. Full and frank
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Id. at 799 (quoting WIs. STAT. § 905.11).
Id. at 798 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 905.03(2)).
Id. at 796.
Id. at 800.
Seeid. at 801.
Id. at 802.

400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
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communication is in turn promoted by endowing the communication
with confidentiality. If the privilege did not exist, "everyone would
be thrown upon his own legal resources."
Deprived of all
professional assistance, a man would not venture to consult any
skillful person, or would only dare to tell his counselor half his case.
Attorney-client communication is promoted when a client may give
documents to an attorney that further the representation without
fearing that the attorney will release the documents to an adversary
who will use the documents against the client. Clients aware that an
attorney's disclosure waives the privilege may keep critical
information from their attorney, thus thwarting the policy of free flow
of information that lies behind the attorney-client privilege. One way
to encourage a client to communicate fully with his or her attorney is
to hold that
only the client should be able to waive the attorney-client
40 3
privilege.
The defendants also argued that the purpose of a trial is to find the
truth, and that a finding of waiver would help reveal the truth and thus
promote justice. 40 4 While acknowledging the defendants' point, the court
reasoned that the preservation of confidentiality in attorney-client
communications better promotes the smooth functioning of the judicial
system.40 5
Harold Sampson is a strange and flawed decision. Although the
Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that the case was not an inadvertent
disclosure case, such that the inadvertent disclosure rules adopted by
other jurisdictions did not apply, 40 6 the court treated it as such, and
essentially applied the "lenient approach" to inadvertent disclosures.
The court's attempt to distinguish inadvertent disclosure cases was
weak. Specifically, the court reasoned that it was not presented with an
inadvertent disclosure because "[t]he only mistake seems to have been
40 7
the attorney's conclusion that the documents were not privileged.9
But that is also "the only mistake" that lawyers make in cases where, for
example, they inadvertently include privileged documents among nonprivileged ones in a document production. The Harold Sampson court
should have branded the case one of inadvertent disclosure and then
applied the lenient approach to determine whether Elliott's disclosure of
the plaintiffs' documents waived the attorney-client privilege. Because
the lenient approach holds that the privilege must be knowingly waived,
the result would have been the same. That course would have allowed

403. Id. at 802-03 (footnotes omitted).
404. Id. at 803.
405. Id.

406. Id. at 799.
407. Id. at 799-800.
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the court to logically avoid established agency law to reach its desired
result instead of simply casting aside that law for no good reason.
With respect to agency law, there is much the Harold Sampson
court ignored.
The attorney-client relationship is an agency
relationship.4 °8 An agent is presumed to be acting within the scope of his
authority where his actions are legal and the third-party with whom he is
dealing has no notice of the agent's limitations.40 9 Where an agent has
apparent authority to act for a principal, the principal is bound by the
agent's unauthorized acts on his behalf.410 An agent's apparent authority
arises from the principal's manifestation of authority to a third-party, not
from the principal's manifestation to the agent.4 '
Applying these basic agency principles to the facts of Harold
Sampson, Elliott was the plaintiffs' agent, he presumably was acting
within the scope of his authority when he produced the documents at
issue, and he had apparent authority to produce the documents.
Accordingly, he waived the plaintiffs' privilege. And, although it is true
that Elliott could not have effected a waiver if the defendants knew or
should have known that he did not have authority to produce the
documents, 412 there was no way for them to know that. They could not
have ethically communicated with the plaintiffs to determine the scope of
Elliott's authority.413 It cannot be argued that the defendants should have
known that Elliott was acting outside the scope of his authority simply
because he produced privileged documents; clients and lawyers
sometimes produce documents that are privileged or that might otherwise
enjoy work product immunity when they think that doing so serves
important strategic goals.4 14
408. Rosenauer v. Scherer, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 674, 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Seaboard
Sur. Co. v. Boney, 761 A.2d 985, 989, 992 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); Multilist Serv. of
Cape Girardeau, Mo., Inc. v. Wilson, 14 S.W.3d 110, 114 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); Crane
Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cresap, 103 P.3d 535, 537 (Mont. 2004); Daniel v. Moore, 596
S.E.2d 465, 469 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting case); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v.
Taylor, 4 P.3d 1242, 1253 n.39 (Okla. 2000); DiLuglio v. Providence Auto Body, Inc.,
755 A.2d 757, 766 (R.I. 2000) (quoting case); Hill & Griffith Co. v. Bryant, 139 S.W.3d
688, 696 (Tex. App. 2004).
409. WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 185 (3d ed.

2001).
410. Id. at 182.
411. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1958).
412. GREGORY, supra note 409, at 184.
413. See MODEL RULES, supra note 97, at R. 4.2 (governing communications with
persons represented by counsel); MODEL CODE, supra note 98, at DR 7-104(A)(1) (same).
414. The defendants would have been justified in assuming that Elliott knew what he
was doing when he produced the documents. Elliott was "a 'prominent, experienced,
competent, well-respected board certified civil trial lawyer, who [was] known to have
handled many difficult[,] complex and high-profile civil lawsuits."' Harold Sampson
Children's Trust v. Linda Gale Sampson 1979 Trust, 679 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Wis. 2004)
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that under agency law
principles a litigant ordinarily is bound by its lawyer's acts,4 15 but it
simply declared that law to be undesirable in this situation.416 The chief
problem with picking and choosing when to apply settled law-instead
of approaching a problem in a way that respects that law, such as taking
the lenient approach to inadvertent waiver-is that it yields horribly
uncertain results. Furthermore, what appears to be result-oriented
reasoning diminishes public confidence in courts. Because it is the rule
everywhere that the attorney-client privilege is held by the client rather
than by the lawyer, litigants may be tempted to rely on Harold Sampson
in efforts to defeat waiver allegations. For the reasons expressed here,
they should not.
VIII. The Transmission and Receipt of Invisible Information
Documents created with word processing software contain
"metadata. 4 17 Metadata is information embedded in a document's
electronic file that is automatically created by the software the author is
using without the author's intent or knowledge.418 It is, quite simply,
"data about data., 4 19 Metadata may include the author's name, the
names of prior authors, the identity of the server or hard disk where the
document is saved, file properties and summary information, document
revisions and versions, template information, the names of people to
whom the document has been sent, comments, the time spent editing the
document, custom document properties, and more. 420 "Metadata can be
as revealing as a postmark on a letter, fingerprints on the envelope, and
DNA from saliva on the seal."4 2' Furthermore, because lawyers often
reuse documents and templates, the amount of metadata that a document
contains is often impossible to judge.4 2
Many lawyers know that documents transmitted electronically
contain metadata. One lawyer has even boasted publicly that "[t]he first

(quoting discovery referee).
415. Id.at 801.
416. Id. at 802.
417. David Hricik & Robert R. Jueneman, The Transmission and Receipt of Invisible
Confidential Information, PROF. LAW., Spring 2004, at 18, 18; Jason Krause, Hidden
Agendas, ABA J., July 2004, at 26, 26; Donna Payne & Bruce Lewis, What You Can 't
See, Can Hurt You, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at 16, 16; Thomas E. Spahn, Litigation
Ethics in the Modern Age, BRIEF, Winter 2004, at 12, 16.
418. Hill & Johnson, supra note 13, at 102.
419. Spahn, supra note 417, at 16.
420. Hricik & Jueneman, supra note 417, at 18; Krause, supra note 417, at 27; Payne
& Lewis, supra note 417, at 16.
421. Krause, supra note 417, at 26.
422. Id.
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thing I do when I get something is look for [metadata] like the author's
name, revisions, and history. 'A 23 The problem, quite obviously, is the
associated transmission of confidential information.424
Given lawyers' ethical obligation to maintain clients' confidences,
they should exercise reasonable care to strip metadata from documents
exchanged with adversaries, electronically filed with courts, or disclosed
to the public.4 25 Alternatively, lawyers might transmit documents in
electronic formats that do not allow metadata to be revealed.426 The
easiest solution, of course, is simply to send paper copies of documents.
Since the threat to client confidentiality and attorney work product
posed by metadata is now known, it is appropriate to focus on the
lawyers who receive electronic documents loaded with invisible
information. Do they have any ethical obligations with respect to the
metadata hidden in the documents sent to them? On the one hand, it
might be reasonably argued that lawyers' duty to competently represent
their clients obligates them to uncover the metadata in the documents
they receive and, if possible, use any information revealed to their
clients' advantage.427 On the other hand, it can just as easily be argued
that electronically ransacking a document to uncover metadata is
dishonest-it is no different than rummaging through another lawyer's
briefcase when he leaves the room, or eavesdropping on another lawyer's
private conversation with her client.
The New York State Bar Association's Committee on Professional
Ethics attempted to resolve this debate in a 2001 ethics opinion.42 8 The
Committee saw no difference between a lawyer's surreptitious
examination of metadata and "less technologically sophisticated means
of invading the attorney-client relationship" that have been "rejected as
inconsistent with the ethical norms of the profession. ' '429 The Committee
concluded that a lawyer's surreptitious use of technology to obtain
another party's potentially confidential information would violate New
York's ethics rules prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, deceit,
fraud or misrepresentation, as well as conduct prejudicial to the

423. Id. (quoting lawyer).
424. See id. (describing confidential information learned from an examination of
metadata found in a document from a major intellectual property lawsuit).
425. Hricik & Jueneman, supra note 417, at 18.
426. Id. at 18-19 (describing how this can be accomplished).
427. MODEL RULES, supra note 97, at R. 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client."); MODEL CODE, supra note 98, at EC 6-1 ("Because of his
vital role in the legal process, a lawyer should act with competence and proper care in
representing clients.").
428. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. No. 749, 2001 WL 1890308
(Dec. 14, 2001).
429. Id. at *2.
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administration of justice.43 °
Because a lawyer intends another party to see the text of the
document being transmitted, but does not intend the other party to see the
invisible information embedded in it, it is tempting to analyze the
transmission and receipt of confidential information in the form of
metadata under any of the rules governing the inadvertent disclosure of
privileged information.43 1 Under the moderate approach to inadvertent
disclosure, for example, a court would need to look at the precautions
against disclosure taken by the transmitting attorney, such as whether she
"scrubbed" the document before sending it, or whether she had the
ability to transmit the document in an electronic form that does not lend
itself to technological analysis by the recipient.43
There are two problems with an inadvertent waiver approach to
metadata transmission and retrieval. First, metadata cannot be easily
removed from documents; scrubbing software is not foolproof.433 This
fact undermines the argument that a lawyer who electronically transmits
a document to a third party knowingly shares with that party any
metadata in the document. Second, a transmitting lawyer may never
know that her adversary is retrieving metadata from her documents, thus
she does not know to take remedial steps that a court might consider
434
important in an inadvertent waiver analysis.
The issues raised here are not easily resolved. Lawyers who
transmit documents electronically need to exercise reasonable care to
avoid revealing clients' confidential information in metadata.435 On the
other hand, lawyers who are inclined to search documents they receive
for metadata do so at the risk that their conduct will be declared
dishonest or prejudicial to the administration of justice. In litigation,
there is the risk that electronic snooping may lead to disqualification.
Thus, a trial lawyer who believes that she can gain some advantage by
retrieving her adversary's metadata might wish to consider a preemptive
motion with the court seeking a declaration that her conduct is
permissible. The downside to this approach is that it obviously alerts her
adversary to the issue, such that future documents are unlikely to contain
meaningful electronic information.

430. Id.
431. Seeid.at*3.
432. See supra notes 351-55 and the accompanying text (discussing the "middle,"
"moderate," or "modem" approach to inadvertent disclosure of confidential information).
433. Hricik & Jueneman, supra note 417, at 18.
434. See id. at 20 (observing that a lawyer is unlikely to know that an adversary is
electronically gathering information about her or her clients).
435. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 782, 2004 WL 3021157, at
*2 (2004).
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IX. Insurance, the Duty to Cooperate, and Waiver
Individuals and entities that are sued often turn to their liability
insurers for a defense. An insured that seeks a defense from its liability
insurer must cooperate with the insurer in that defense. An insured's
duty to cooperate is contractual and is imposed by cooperation clauses in
standard liability insurance policies.436 Cooperation clauses typically
obligate insureds to provide evidence, to assist the insurer in discovery,
to attend depositions and appear in court when requested, to assist the
insurer in the prosecution of cross-claims and third-party claims, to help
the insurer enforce its subrogation rights, and more. 37 A directors' and
officers' liability insurance policy may provide:
The INSURER shall not be called upon to assume charge of the
investigation, settlement or defense of any demand, suit or
proceeding, but the INSURER shall have the right and shall be given
the opportunity to associate with the DIRECTORS, OFFICERS and
COMPANY or any underlying insurer, or both, in the investigation,
settlement, defense and control of any demand, suit or proceeding
relative to any WRONGFUL ACT where the demand, suit or
proceeding involves or may involve the INSURER. At all times, the
DIRECTORS, OFFICERS and COMPANY and the INSURER shall
cooperate in the investigation,
settlement and defense of such
438
demand, suit orproceeding.

Insureds' duty to cooperate is very broad and, in many jurisdictions,
includes the obligation to provide the insurer with information that it
may use to defeat coverage. 439 The issue here is whether the duty is so
broad as to operate as a waiver of the insured's attorney-client privilege
in coverage litigation with its insurer. Waste Management, Inc. v.
InternationalSurplus Lines Insurance CO.44 0 is a leading case on point.
In Waste Management, two insurers sought to discover attorneyclient communications between their insureds and the insureds' lawyers
in connection with environmental litigation for which the insurers were
being asked to indemnify the insureds. 441 The insureds refused to

436. ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 845 (3d ed. 2002).
437. Douglas R. Richmond, Liability Insurers' Right to Defend Their Insureds, 35
CREIGHTON L. REV. 115, 122 (2001).
438. ASSOCIATED ELEC. & GAS INS. SERVS. LTD., DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY
INSURANCE POLICY 8 (2002) (emphasis added) (on file with the author).
439. See, e.g., Metlife Auto & Home v. Cunningham, 797 N.E.2d 18, 23 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2003) (observing that "the better rule is that the duty to cooperate does include the
obligation to provide accurate information bearing on coverage").
440. 579 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1991).
441. See id. at 324-25.
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provide the requested documents on privilege grounds.44 2 The insurers
contended that the cooperation clauses in the insureds' policies, which
obligated the insureds to "give all such information and assistance as the
insurers may reasonably require," abrogated the insureds' attorney-client
privilege. 4 3
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the insurers,
stating:
Here, the cooperation clause imposes a broad duty of cooperation and
is without limitation or qualification. It represents the contractual
obligations imposed upon and accepted by insureds at the time they
entered into the agreement with insurers. In light of the plain
language of the cooperation clause in particular, and language in the
policy as a whole, it cannot seriously be contended that insureds
would not be required to disclose contents of any communications
they had with defense counsel representing them on a claim for
which insurers had the ultimate duty to satisfy.
... [W]e address one additional point. Insureds maintain that the
purpose of the cooperation clause was mooted once the underlying
lawsuit was terminated. We disagree. Insureds' duty to cooperate
concerning matters covered by the insurance agreement.., continues
for as long as insureds seek to enforce its terms, and certainly to the
point when insurers were requested to perform their end of the
bargain. The fact that the parties are now adverse concerning the
interpretation of such terms does not negate insureds' contractual
duty.
A fair reading of the terms of the contract renders any expectation of
attorney-client privilege, under these circumstances, unreasonable.
We conclude that the element of confidentiality is wanting and,
therefore, the attorney-client privilege does not apply
to bar discovery
44
of the communications in the underlying lawsuits.
Although a few courts have adopted the Waste Management
position, 445 or have indicated that they might do SO, 44 6 most courts
presented with the issue have rejected the Illinois Supreme Court's
reasoning.447 The courts that have declined to follow Waste Management

442. Id. at 325.
443. Id. at 327-28 (quoting cooperation clauses in policies).
444. Id. at 328.
445. See, e.g., First Fid. Bancorp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 90-1866,
1994 WL 111363, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 1994).
446. See, e.g., Metlife Auto & Home v. Cunningham, 797 N.E.2d 18, 22-23 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2003).
447. See, e.g., Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Tonka Corp., 140 F.R.D. 381, 386 (D. Minn.
1992); N. River Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp., 797 F. Supp. 363, 368-69
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have good reason for doing so. The insured's duty to cooperate "is
essentially the flipside of the insurer's duty to defend, ' 448 and a solid
argument can thus be made that a cooperation clause waives the
insured's attorney-client privilege vis-A-vis the insurer only in a case
where their interests are aligned in defending the insured against a claim
by a third-party. 449 Some insurers concede that the cooperation clause is
not intended to waive the insured's attorney-client privilege in litigation
with the insurer or in any other situation. 45°
Of course, even in Illinois and other jurisdictions following the
Waste Management approach, the fact that an insured might refuse to
reveal privileged communications, and thus breach its duty to cooperate,
does not necessarily mean that it will lose its coverage. This is because
in most jurisdictions "the insured's breach of the cooperation clause will
not relieve the insurer of its obligations under the policy unless the lack
of cooperation is substantial and material."4 5' In these jurisdictions, the
insurer must prove that it was prejudiced by the insured's failure to
cooperate.4 52
Because the reach of the attorney-client privilege generally is an
issue of state law, and many states have not considered the effect of
cooperation clauses in insurance policies on the attorney-client privilege,
this issue is far from settled. A parallel issue is whether an insured that
shares privileged information with an insurer that may be its adversary in
future coverage litigation waives its privilege with respect to government
agencies and other third-parties.4 53 These are concerns to which litigants
must be sensitive.
X.

Receivers, Trustees, Liquidators and Examiners

Businesses fail all the time, mostly without allegations
wrongdoing on the part of their owners, officers, directors,

of
or

(D.N.J. 1992); Pittston Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 143 F.R.D. 66, 72 (D.N.J. 1992);
Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D. 408, 416-17 (D. Del. 1992);
Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 156-60 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 730 A.2d 51, 63-64 (Conn. 1999);
E. Air Lines, Inc. v. United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 716 So. 2d 340, 342-43
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Dedham-Westwood Water Dist. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co.,
No. CIV.A. 96-00044, 2000 WL 33593142, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2000); State
v. Hydrite Chem. Co., 582 N.W.2d 411,420-21 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
448. JERRY, supra note 436, at 845.
449.

E. Air Lines Inc., 716 So. 2d at 343.

450. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158.
451. JERRY, supra note 436, at 847.
452. Metlife Auto & Home v. Cunningham, 797 N.E.2d 18, 23-24 (Mass. App. Ct.
2003).
453. See, e.g., First Fid. Bancorp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 90-1866,
1994 WL 111363, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 1994) (discussing this concern).
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professional service providers. But that is not always the case. If
litigation ensues, assertion and waiver of the failed or failing entity's
attorney-client privilege can be an issue. If a business continues under
new management charged with turning around its fortunes, the authority
to assert and waive the privilege passes with control of the company to
the new managers. 454 "Displaced managers may not assert the privilege
over the wishes of current managers, even as to statements the former
might have made to counsel concerning matters within the scope of their
corporate duties. 455 Most disputes arise where a bankruptcy trustee,
bankruptcy examiner, liquidator, or receiver is involved and privileged
communications made before the bankruptcy, liquidation or receivership
are the subject of discovery.
A.

Bankruptcy Trustees and Examiners

The mere filing of a bankruptcy petition does not waive the debtor's
attorney-client privilege.45 6 A bankruptcy trustee's power to waive the
privilege depends on whether the debtor is an entity or an individual.4 57
In the case of an individual debtor, a trustee's ability to waive the
debtor's attorney-client privilege depends on the facts of the particular
case. In general:
The inquiry [of whether a bankruptcy trustee can waive the attorneyclient privilege] requires balancing the interests of a full and frank
discussion in the attorney-client relationship and the harm to the
debtor upon a disclosure with the trustee's duty to maximize the
458
value of the debtor's estate and represent the interests of the estate.
Courts are unlikely to permit the trustee to waive the debtor's
attorney-client privilege in cases in which the trustee and the debtor have
an adversarial relationship.45 9
Things are more settled where a corporation or partnership is
involved. In Commodity Futures Trading Comm 'n v. Weintraub,46 ° the
Supreme Court held that the trustee of a bankrupt corporation has the
power to waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to
454. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 349 (1985).
455. Id.
456. In re Muskogee Envtl. Conservation Co., 221 B.R. 526, 532 (Bankr. N.D.Okla.
1998) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985)).
457. 2 RICE ET AL., supra note 50, § 9:12, at 30.
458. Moore v. Eason (In re Bazemore), 216 B.R. 1020, 1023-24 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
1998); see also In re Foster, 188 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 1999) (accepting this
balancing test).
459. See, e.g., In re Miller, 247 B.R. 704, 710-11 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000) (involving
alleged bankruptcy fraud by debtor).
460. 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
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pre-bankruptcy communications. 46 1 This is because the trustee of a
bankrupt corporation fills the role "most closely analogous to that of a
solvent corporation's management., 462 The same principle clearly holds
true where the bankrupt entity is a limited partnership, 463 and there is no
reason that it should not extend to general partnerships. 464 Any
partnership-whether limited or general-is like a corporation in that it
can only
act through its agents, and the same rules should therefore
4 65
apply.

Bankruptcy courts may appoint examiners, whose duties typically
are more limited than those of trustees. 466 An examiner usually is
appointed for the purpose of investigating alleged dishonesty, fraud,
incompetence, misconduct or mismanagement of the debtor by its current
management, while a trustee has the power to operate the debtor's
business.46 7 An examiner has a statutory duty to file a report of his
investigation and to transmit a copy of that report to any creditors'
committees or equity security holders' committees, to any indenture
trustees, and to any other entities that the bankruptcy court designates.4 68
A court may, however, empower an examiner to perform
managerial functions normally carried out by a trustee.46 9 In such a case,
461. Id.at 358.
462. Id. at 353.
463. United States v. Campbell, 73 F.3d 44, 47 (5th Cir. 1996); Meoli v. Am. Med.
Serv. of San Diego, 287 B.R. 808, 815-17 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
464. See Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 96 (5th Cir. 1994) (concluding that there is no
reason to treat corporations and partnerships differently for purposes of attorney-client
relationships); In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that the
attorney-client privilege test that it previously adopted, "although expressly applicable to
corporations and their employees, is no less instructive as applied to a partnership or
some other client entity").
465. See Campbell, 73 F.3d at 47 (discussing limited partnerships); Zimmerman v.
Dan Kamphausen Co., 971 P.2d 236, 239 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that "[a]s a
general rule every partner is an agent of a general partnership for the purpose of carrying
on its authorized business"); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 301(1) (Vernon
1970 & Cum. Supp. 2004) (stating that a partnership can sue and be sued in its
partnership name).
466. In re Boileau, 736 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1984).
467. In re Am. Bulk Transp. Co., 8 B.R. 337, 340 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980); see also 11
U.S.C.A. §§ 1106(a)(3) & (b) (1993) (providing that an examiner shall, except to the
extent the court orders otherwise, "investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and
financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the
desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other matter relevant to the case
or to the formulation of a plan").
468. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1l06(a)(4)(A) & (B) (1993).
469. In re Boileau, 736 F.2d at 506; see also 11 U.S.C.A. §1106(b) (1993) ("An
examiner appointed under section 1104(b) of this title shall perform the duties specified
in paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a) of this section, and, except to the extent the
court orders otherwise, any other duties of the trustee that the court orders the debtor in
possession not to perform.").
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the examiner has the authority to waiver the debtor's attorney-client
privilege. 470 Additionally, a court may authorize an examiner to waive
the debtor's attorney-client privilege, as was done in the Enron
bankruptcy.4 7'
B.

Liquidatorsand Receivers

In the late 1980's and early 1990's, many failed financial
institutions were taken over by regulators, and various federal agencies
became liquidators or receivers for the institutions. The agencies sued
the institutions' law firms for assisting the institutions' managers in
various frauds. Claiming to stand in the shoes of the institutions, the
agencies demanded that the law firms turn over their entire files. When
firms resisted on attorney-client privilege grounds, the agencies asserted
that they had the right to waive the privilege, thus removing it as an
impediment to discovery. In other instances, the government asserted a
failed institution's attorney-client privilege in an effort to resist discovery
by professionals that it had sued.472
From these battles two general rules emerged. First, a liquidator
does not succeed to a failed entity's attorney-client privilege, and thus
does not have the power to waive it. 473 Second, a receiver does succeed
to a failed entity's attorney-client privilege, and thus can waive it.474 The
reasoning behind these different outcomes is that a receiver continues the
entity's operations; the entity to which the privilege belongs continues to
exist. 475 The receiver functions as a manager, or much like a bankruptcy
trustee. That is not the case where a government agency functions as a
liquidator.476 A liquidator takes control of a company's assets for the
purpose of disposing of them. "There is no thought or effort to
reconstitute the entity or to run it at all." 477 A transfer of an entity's

470. In re Boileau, 736 F.2d at 506.
471. Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 I04(c) and 1106(b) Directing Appointment of
Enron Corp. Examiner, In re Enron Corp., Case No. 01-16034(AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 8, 2002), at 3 ("ORDERED that the Examiner shall have the power to waive, on an
issue-by-issue basis, the attorney-client privilege of the debtors' estates with respect to
pre-petition communications relating to matters to be investigated by the Examiner
hereunder.... Such a waiver shall be a limited and not a general waiver .. ")(on file
with the author).
472. See, e.g., FDIC v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 131 F.R.D. 202 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
473. See FDIC v. Amundson, 682 F. Supp. 981, 986-87 (D. Minn. 1988); FDIC v.
McAtee, 124 F.R.D. 662, 664 (D. Kan. 1988).
474. See Odmark v. Westside Bancorp., 636 F. Supp. 552, 554-55 (W.D. Wash.
1986).
475. See McAtee, 124 F.R.D. at 664.
476. See Amundson, 682 F. Supp. at 987.
477. Id.
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assets to a liquidator does not transfer the entity's attorney with them.478
These rules remain true today, as Commodity Futures Trading
Comm 'n v. Standard Forex, Inc. 4 79 demonstrates. In Standard Forex,
the CFTC sued Standard Forex and several of its former officers and
directors. The magistrate on the case appointed a receiver and entered
other injunctive relief.480 The CFTC subpoenaed Standard Forex's law
firm, Longo & Bell, to turn over certain documents to the receiver.
Longo & Bell resisted on attorney-client privilege grounds, joined by
two of the company's former officers and directors, Lao and Feng.481
The magistrate ordered Longo & Bell to turn over the documents,
reasoning that the power to assert or waive the company's privilege
rested with the receiver, who was functioning as Standard Forex's
management in receivership.482 Lao, Feng, and Longo & Bell sought
review of the magistrate's order by the district court.483
The district court noted that its orders appointing the receiver
granted him very broad powers, much like the powers granted to
bankruptcy trustees.484 Additionally, the receiver performed many
management and legal roles that otherwise would have been performed
by the company's former managers.4 85 It was therefore obvious that the
receiver, and not the former officers and directors, had ultimate control
of the company. 486
Nonetheless, the district court was willing to transfer control of the
company's attorney-client privilege to the receiver only if there was a
"valid reason" to do so. 487 The CFTC and the receiver supplied the
reason:
The CFTC contends that the Receiver should be granted control over
the attorney-client privilege so that the Receiver can assist the CFTC
in discovering the truth as to Standard Forex' violation of the
Commodities Exchange Act and whether any of the individual
defendants directly or indirectly violated the Act. In essence, the
CFTC believes that the communications possessed by Longo & Bell
may provide evidence on the issue of who actually controlled
Standard Forex during the time relevant to this action and who
478.

See McAtee, 124 F.R.D. at 664 (quoting In re Yam Processing Patent Validity

Litig., 520 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1976)).
479.

882 F. Supp. 40 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).

480. Id. at 41.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484.

Id. at 42.

485. Id. at 43.
486. Id.
487. Id.
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knowingly induced it to engage in the illegal conduct alleged. The
CFTC is especially interested in whether this is true of defendants
Lao and Feng....

The CFTC also believes that Longo & Bell may

have copies of documents relevant to this action....
The Receiver has also indicated that the documents possessed by
Longo & Bell contain information that will assist him in taking legal
action against certain third parties to recover assets of Standard
488
Forex. This is an essential element of the Receiver's role here.
Although there was no evidence that anyone would be prejudiced by
granting the receiver control over Standard Forex's attorney-client
privilege, Lao, Feng, and Longo & Bell contended that the privilege had
to remain with the corporation. 489 The district court rejected this
argument, making the receiver the only party operating Standard
Forex. 490 The district court thus affirmed the magistrate's order directing
production of the documents at issue.491

XI.

Conclusion

Many lawyers and clients view the attorney-client privilege as
sacrosanct. There is, however, much that the privilege does not protect.
As a doctrine, the attorney-client privilege is fraught with exceptions and
heavy with the potential for inadvertent waiver. On top of this, the
federal government has launched an assault on the privilege in
connection with corporate criminal investigations, and recent corporate
scandals have raised as an issue the appropriate limits of attorneys' duty
of confidentiality. The same concerns that are causing courts, scholars
and practicing lawyers to carefully examine the limits of the attorneyclient privilege also apply in many cases to lawyers' work product
immunity and obligations under state ethics rules.
Now, more than ever, lawyers must understand the many aspects of
the attorney-client privilege, work product immunity, and ethical duty of
confidentiality. They must understand the problems posed when they
engage public relations consultants, they must avoid inadvertent waivers,
they must appreciate the confidentiality issues posed by the use of
technology in practice, they must realize that a client's cooperation with
the government may give rise to selective waiver arguments, they must
consider the effect of cooperation clauses in their clients' insurance
policies when asking their insurers to defend them in litigation, and so
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on. Lawyers' important duties to preserve clients' confidences, which
have always required great diligence and caution on lawyers' parts, are
becoming harder to satisfy in a changing legal climate.

